Tag: materialism

Podcast: “The Leviathan of Christian Atheism”

I just did a podcast with J. R. Miller’s & Leroy Hill’s “Raze the Roof” podcast. We discussed Thomas Hobbes’s ethical views, and how these are related to his views of what is real (ontology) and how we know things (epistemology). We also looked at his religious views, which have been described as a type of “Christian atheism.”

Even though Hobbes died long ago (1679), his ideas still affect us today, including a political philosophy of power, leadership, and ethical narcissism. What can we as Christians do to help address how these views, whether for Christians to grow as disciples, or as we engage in evangelism?

Ep 15: The Leviathan of Christian Atheism (substack.com)

Can we have knowledge if naturalism is true?

We are doing much cutting-edge work in the MA Christian Apologetics program at Talbot School of Theology. Please join us!

Here’s one of them. One of my biggest interests is to see what needs to be real for us to have knowledge. One key focus for me has been to see if we can have knowledge, given naturalism.

Here, I give a talk on that subject, using the views of a leading philosopher of neuroscience, Daniel Dennett. I try to show that we cannot have knowledge based on naturalism. I also have written on this topic in (e.g.) Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality: Testing Religious Truth-claims.

I think this is an important line of argument we can use to help show naturalism is false. For, there are many things we do in fact know. But that must be due to the reality of a very different worldview.

Ethics & Critical Race Theory

Here’s a new video created and posted by my program, the MA Christian Apologetics at Talbot School of Theology/Biola University. The ethics of CRT is one of my latest areas of research, and now I am working with one of our graduates, Michael Williams, on a forthcoming book. One of the things we are trying to do is give a careful description of CRT, including its underlying philosophical presuppositions, and then assess it in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. This talk gives an overview of several of those things.

Dr. R. Scott Smith talks on Critical Race Theory (youtube.com)

More Problems from Critical Race Theory’s Antiessentialism

Introduction

In previous posts, I have assessed CRT from a couple main standpoints. First, CRT’s rejection of essences leaves core moral principles, like justice and equality, as nothing but our constructs. We get to define them as we see fit. So, these core morals also end up being just the results of hegemonic power, the very thing Crits decry. Second, CRT bases the value of humans on their self-conceptualizations (their “true selves”), but this basis cannot preserve our dignity and equality. It substitutes our constructs for intrinsic value. And, if people construct their value, others can deconstruct it and take it away.

While these problems are serious, they are not the only ones due to CRT’s antiessentialism. Here I will look at two more. In the next blog, I will raise a third issue stemming from what kind of thing morals (& humans) are according to CRT. These problems undermine even CRT’s good ethical claims.

The Problem for Autonomy

A major point of appeal of CRT is that humans should be free to define their “true selves” by their own self-conceptualizations. To do this, they must throw off the categories of the majority’s ideology.

Now, surely we have abilities to form our identities (i.e., our self-concepts), and we do this all the time. People may understand themselves (their “sense of identity”) primarily in terms of various self-chosen concepts and categories, whether those be job-, race-, gender-, class-, religion-, or other-related. Christians do this, too, in that they are to see themselves first and foremost as disciples of Jesus, versus under some other aspect that could take priority (e.g., one’s achievements, wealth, etc.)

But, CRT posits that we are nothing but material beings, without an essential nature, which would be the soul. As such, we would seem to be completely subject to the laws of physical state-state causation. In short, it seems we would be exhaustively determined in our choices and actions, such that we would not have any freedom of the will, which is presupposed by, and necessary for, our being autonomous.

However, perhaps a compatibilist view about freedom of the will could be used to help preserve our freedom, all the while we are beings that are subjects of state-state causation. How? Compatibilism asserts that freedom is consistent with being determined. In terms of ability, compatibilism claims that at any given time, a person can do only one thing, which depends upon the state that person happens to be in. In terms of control, of a previous chain of states produces one’s choices and actions. Last, in terms of reason, does not originate anything, like new thoughts or inquiries; it is passive.

In short, compatibilism is consistent with a view of a materialist view of humans. They are just bundles of properties that pass on what they receive from prior states. Thus, at the very least, it is very hard to see how there is any room for a self to originate any kinds of thought or desires, much less freely define one’s true self. If these things are so, then it seems CRT cannot adequately ground its own appeals to our autonomy, which is one of its major “selling points.”

The Problem for Justice

The second issue I will explore in this blog is an implication for justice. Not only is justice up to us, I also think it is impossible to achieve on CRT. Here I will explore one aspect of this issue.

Why would justice be impossible to achieve on CRT? For justice to be done for someone, it presupposes that that person can be identified by us and, even more importantly, is the very one who was treated unjustly before. Then, legally, society can bring remedies to correct that injustice.

But, it seems impossible for there to be any continuity of a given self through time and change on CRT. This issue involves what is called personal identity: what is it that makes a given person the same one through time and change? This is different from CRT’s frequent appeal to one’s sense of identity, which is our way of defining and conceiving of ourselves. Since CRT rejects essences, they cannot be the basis for one’s personal identity. Instead, CRT seems left with appealing to possible solutions that can fit with materialism. What might those include?

I will focus on two main possibilities. The first is that the sameness of person is grounded in sameness of memories. If a person P2 has the memories of someone (P1) who was treated unjustly in the past, then P2 is the same person as P1.

Now, since the law of identity requires that for two things to be identical (there is really only one thing, not two), all their properties must be in common. Now, is this true in the case of P1 and P2? Even if P2 has the same memories of that injustice as P1, P2 & P1 have different temporal properties. Suppose, for example, that P2 is now 45 years old, whereas P1 was treated unjustly (say, for being discriminated against by the practice of redlining in real estate) at age 30. Also, P2 has earned a master degree, whereas P1 had only a bachelor’s degree. Moreover, P2 has been divorced and also does not have his appendix, while P1 was married and had his appendix.

Clearly, then, there are things true of P2 that are not true of P1. Following the law of identity, they are not the same person. Moreover, on a materialist view, it seems that persons are just bundles of material properties, including their memories. There is no underlying essence that would make them the same person, despite differences of temporal or other kinds of properties and parts.

The second option for personal identity on a materialist view is sameness of story. If the story of P2 is identical to the story of P1, then they are the same person. But this too cannot be the case; surely P2 has more details in his story than that of P1, even if the rest of P2’s story matches completely that of P1’s. Again, the law of identity forces us to conclude that they are not the same person.

Is it possible then for a person who was treated unjustly in the past to have that injustice remedied? It seems it would not on CRT, for it lacks a basis for the sameness of persons through time and change. Literally, there is no continuity of persons on CRT’s materialism, and so there is no possibility for justice to be meted out to people.

Of course, many will object to this, perhaps by appealing to our common sense understanding that surely P1 & P2 are the same person. Again, they might do this by appealing to memories, or perhaps to a set of sufficient commonalities of body parts to justify the claim that they are the same person. But all this does is establish for others how we may know that P1 & P2 are the same person. Our knowledge does not make P1 & P2 the same person; rather, that knowledge depends upon their being the same person. And that issue is the one that materialists seem unable to provide.

In the next blog, I will turn to issues posed by their nominalism (i.e., everything is particular and is what it is in name only) for morals and humans.

Critical Race Theory & Its Ethical Stances

Introduction

In the previous entry, I surveyed some of the key tenets of critical race theory (CRT), including its appeal to hegemony, the concept of “domination by the ruling class and unconscious acceptance of that state of affairs by the subordinate group.”[1] I also sketched some key philosophical principles of CRT, including its rejection of essences and thus universals, which would be one thing (a truth, or a property) that can have many instances. Instead, they seem to embrace materialism, as well as the view that everything is particular, or nominal, being what it is in name only. Finally, Crits think we have been so shaped by our “situatedness” that no one knows how things really are, apart from our interpretive standpoints. Now, let’s turn to explore some key ethical positions of CRT.

Major Ethical Claims

As we already have seen, CRT holds that the oppression of humans is wrong. Moreover, CRT identifies this oppression with that of the majority group over the minority ones. Therefore, the oppressed groups must be liberated from their oppression.

Now, interestingly, Crits seem to argue for this view as though it simply is wrong as a matter of principle. For instance, they do not argue for this view on the basis of utilitarianism. If they did, it seems that principle could turn out to be false if there are cases where the net result of the good and bad consequences of some action by the majority actually benefits the greatest number of people. If so, then it could be obligatory for the majority to oppress the minorities.

Nor do they argue for it on the basis of ethical egoism, that one should act on the basis of one’s self-interest. If that were their basis, it would be difficult to argue that whites should give up their privilege and power if it is not in their self-interest. Also, they clearly do not appeal to natural law, for that would strongly imply essences which would constrain our ethical precepts.

So, it seems Crits appeal to oppression of humans (especially as a minority group) as wrong, period, which seems to be a deontological principle, one that simply is right in itself. They seem to reason similarly with many other key ethical claims, such as that all humans should be treated as equals and with dignity, respect, and justice. Moreover, they also seem to reason in the same way with their claim that humans should be free to define their “true selves” according to their own conceptualizations, and not that of the majority’s ideology. That is, it seems Crits presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable.

Why should that be the case? One answer given in the history of ethics has been that humans have an essential nature that defines them as being intrinsically valuable. A key source for that view is Christianity, on which humans are made in God’s image. As such, they are not to be mistreated, which would violate their essential moral worth. Another source has been Kant, who argued that humans are members of the kingdom of ends, and they should never be treated merely as a means to an end.

For CRT, since humans do not have an essence and are material beings, it seems some other basis is needed for its ethics. What might that be? Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic suggest that biological differences, such as hair texture and skin color, are superficial and not morally significant. Instead, there are morally relevant, higher-order traits common across races, such as “personality, intelligence, and moral behavior.”[2] Ibram Kendi, an antiracist whose views nonetheless draw extensively from CRT, agrees when he appeals to our “common humanity.”[3]

All these traits seem to fit within a materialist view of humans. Now, there are various ways naturalists who are materialists try to ground ethics. For example, Michael Ruse has argued that ethics is just a biological adaptation, and evolution has foisted upon us the illusion that morals are objectively real and independent of us.[4] James Rachels argued that what makes us valuable is not some essential nature we have. Nor is it our mere biological existence. Rather, it is our biographical life, the story that we tell about ourselves that gives our lives meaning and purpose.[5]

Yet both of these views do not fit with CRT’s evident deontological treatment of moral principles. Perhaps a more fitting option would be Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian view, on which we, while just matter, impose our moral concepts onto matter, willing them to be universalized to all humans.[6] Or, perhaps Erik Wielenberg’s Platonism about morals, yet within an overall materialist framework, might be an option for CRT. For him, it is a brute fact that moral virtues and principles exist as non-physical entities, though humans still are material beings. In his view, morals supervene upon physical facts.[7]

The Next Step

In my next blog, I will begin to assess CRT with a view toward ethics, starting with several of its strengths.

[1] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 175.

[2] Ibid., 9.

[3] Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019), 54, 198.

[4] Michael Ruse, “Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach,” in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (4th ed.; ed. Louis Pojman; Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002).

[5] James Rachels, The End of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See his discussion of Dax Cowart’s case.

[6] See her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.

[7] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Ethics and Critical Race Theory – General and Philosophical Positions

Introduction

In previous posts, I discussed the role of suspicion in critical race theory (CRT), and there I included the influences of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. I also touched on the CRT analysis that power structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy. Moreover, critical legal studies helped reinforce the view that law is mainly about power, not morals. Michel Foucault argued that the dominant group’s power is transmitted and normalized through institutions, and radical feminism contributed how power relates to the construction of social roles, which results in largely unnoticed patterns of domination.

Now, I will explore some more key positions of CRT, starting with some general ones. Then I will look at some key philosophical views, including what is real, and how we know things. In the next blog entry, I will look at several key ethical stances of CRT.

Additional, General Tenets of CRT

First, racism is common, and it is not limited to individuals. It also is systemic, which is the focus of CRT. Second, there is racial disparity: there are differences in outcomes (such as for health and economic considerations) based on race. Third is interest convergence: only if the material interests of the majority group align with those of minoritized groups will the majority group cooperate with minorities.

Fourth, races are social constructions which are not fixed, for they are not rooted in biology. Instead, we all share in a common humanity. Roles and expectations are constructs. Fifth is intersectionality. That is, we all have many sources for our “identities” (or, our self-conceptualizations), and these can overlap in many ways to oppress people (e.g., a poor, black poor lesbian).  Sixth, hegemony is “domination by the ruling class and unconscious acceptance of that state of affairs by the subordinate group.”[1]

To help understand CRT better, let’s also look at some of the key philosophical positions of Crits.

Some Key Philosophical Positions

In addition to these key shaping influences, CRT also draws from the broader stream of thought of critical theory (CT). Like we have seen with CRT, critical theorists embraced the view that oppressed groups need to be liberated from their domination by the oppressor group. Moreover, like Marx, key critical theorists, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were materialists and thus they rejected essential natures. So did Nietzsche.

If essences were real, they would have many implications. Why? Essences would define something as what kind of thing it is.[2] Foe example, for Aristotle, the essence of being a human is due its having a human soul, and not some other “principle of life.” However, Adorno rejected the idea that reality is objectively real with essential natures, for that leads us “to establish a single order, a single mode of representing and relating to reality.”[3] For him, on such a view, people would tend to fit into the definitions from the majority’s ideology. Yet, such a view was just a construct that undergirded the dominant group’s hegemony. Thus, peoples’ freedom to define their “true” selves would be undermined, leaving them oppressed.[4]

Likewise, Horkheimer believed that humans are nothing but material beings embedded holistically in nature.[5] Further, Marcuse believed reality is socially conditioned. Our “essence” is not some ontological reality. It is just a term for our human potential to achieve the ideals present in culture, which involves overcoming oppression:

Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves toward a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical structure of the social process of life.[6]

So, what are some implications for their views if there are no essences? First, since there is no essence, such as the soul, to define and ground one’s personal identity (i.e., what makes someone the same person through time and change), it seems our “identity” is something that is definable by us. This can lead to a great sense of unrestricted freedom to not be bound by any of the dominant group’s ideological categories. Instead, people are free to define their “true selves.”

Second, it seems there are no universal qualities, not just for what it means to be authentically human, but also for moral principles and virtues. For example, suppose justice has an essence. Then it seems there would be an identical quality present in each instance of justice, and justice would be a universal quality. Yet, if there are no essences, then each instance would be particular, or nominal: we would call them all instances of justice, yet that is just due to the word we use for them.

Third, if essences are real, they would exist objectively and transcend our own conceptualizations. Yet, on CT and CRT, we are so shaped by our situating factors that all that we know is from a particular, historically situated standpoint. We cannot transcend those limitations and achieve a gaze directly into how reality is, apart from our “situatedness.” That is a strongly nominalist view. Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, who seem strongly influenced by CRT, claim that knowledge is not “outside of human interests, perspectives, and values”; instead, it “reflects the social hierarchies of a given society.”[7]

The Next Step

In the next entry, I will explore the various moral positions of CRT.

[1] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 175.

[2] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 218.

[3] Andrew Fagan, “Theodor Adorno,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/adorno/, accessed July 11, 2019.

[4] While I was a graduate student in the University of Southern California’s School of Religion, several fellow students were ex-Catholics who were angry that the Church’s hierarchy defined what is “natural,” especially sexually, for them by appealing to natural law and essential natures.

[5] See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (Repr.; New York, NY: Continuum, 1982), 24. In an effort to unify science and philosophy, Horkheimer endorses materialism.

[6] Herbert Marcuse, “Concept of Essence,” in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 67.

[7] Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? in Multicultural Education Series (2nd ed.; ed. James A. Banks; New York: Teachers College Press, 2017), 31. Though DiAngelo might be better classified as an “antiracist,” I include her here because she has embraced much of CRT.

Making Sense of Morality: Critical Theory Overview

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Naturalistic ethics remains a dominant moral approach in the west. But there are at least two other contemporary kinds of ethics. They are critical theory and its particular versions, as well as postmodernism. I will start with critical theory (CT), with a focus today on social justice. 

Overview of Critical Theory

Social justice has a long and venerable history, including efforts such as abolishing British and American slavery; caring for the vulnerable, such as the poor, widows, orphans, and minorities; and caring for the sick, such as through building hospitals. Today, however, there seems to be a “new kind” of social justice that focuses on issues such as (1) economic justice through the redistribution of resources; (2) freedom from discrimination due to one’s gender identity, and to be given positive rights on that basis; (3) environmental justice; and (4) racism and reparations.

Often, these contemporary efforts seem to be grounded in CT, which has a deep influence in the humanities, whether at secular or religious institutions. CT has spawned a number of specific studies, such as critical race, ethnic, legal, gender and queer, and cultural studies. It is having much influence in part because proponents are identifying some real injustices which should be addressed, such as racism, sexism, slavery, economic oppression, mistreatment of women, etc.

Based on several key philosophical positions, and Marxist-inspired thought, CT began in the “Frankfurt school.” That school included several key thinkers, such as Max Horkheimer (d. 1973), Theodor Adorno (d. 1969), and Herbert Marcuse (d. 1979). CT also was influenced by Antonio Gramsci (d. 1937), and all four were influenced significantly by Karl Marx (d. 1883).

Three Key Positions

Some of the reasons for the influence of CT is that it taps into accepted views we have seen. First, it accepts materialism: reality is made of matter, without any essences. Second, everything is particular (nominalism). Third, in terms of knowledge, it accepts historicism.

Historicism is like the view we saw in Kant, that we cannot know reality as it is in itself (i.e., directly). CT rejects knowledge of universal truths for all people at all times and places, for that would require a universal standpoint. Instead, historicists believe all knowledge is situated: it is socially-based and embedded in a given historical location and time. Our situatedness shapes how we interpret reality, and, like a set of lenses, we always experience and interpret reality through that interpretive framework. Yet, we cannot take off our glasses and get a direct, uninterpreted gaze into reality itself. Everything is our interpretation, drawn from our particular historical location.

Nietzsche (d. 1900) helped give rise to historicism, too. As a naturalist, he denied any essences. Also, due to nominalism, there are no literal identities between any two things; we construct things by taking them to be identical. Unlike Kant, there are no truths of reason (a priori). Indeed, things like the will are just words, the way we happen to talk. Even that we are the subjects of our thoughts is just an interpretation according to our grammatical formulae. Our teaching how to use words deceives us to think such things are real. Indeed, claims to know what is real just reflect our will to power, when actually all knowledge is perspectival.

Ethics 

Now, CT posits that there are two groups, the oppressors and the oppressed. A critical theory seeks to liberate people from domination and oppression and increase freedom in all their forms. Ethically, our fundamental duty is to liberate the oppressed. That is done by leveling power and redistributing resources (i.e., material solutions, since matter is what is real). This means an equality ofoutcomes, notopportunity.

Moreover, traditional western societies’ institutions oppress and alienate people from their true selves by disrespect, disapproval, and social inequalities. Instead, people are to be free to live as they want (e.g., define their own sexuality). For secular critical theorists, this liberation is accomplished in part by the state’s coercive power.

For Further Reading

Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Life, Knowledge, and Self-Consciousness,” and “Prejudices of Philosophers,” in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Patrick Gardiner

Roger Scruton, Fools, Frauds and Firebrands: Thinkers of the New Left