Ethics & Critical Race Theory

Here’s a new video created and posted by my program, the MA Christian Apologetics at Talbot School of Theology/Biola University. The ethics of CRT is one of my latest areas of research, and now I am working with one of our graduates, Michael Williams, on a forthcoming book. One of the things we are trying to do is give a careful description of CRT, including its underlying philosophical presuppositions, and then assess it in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. This talk gives an overview of several of those things.

Dr. R. Scott Smith talks on Critical Race Theory (youtube.com)

Article: “Propositions: Who Needs Them? Craig’s Nominalism Revisited”

This essay came out in Philosophia Christi 24:2 (2022). Here’s an abstract:

William Lane Craig has defended nominalist forms of “anti-Platonism” as normative for orthodox Christians. He believes Platonic abstract objects (AOs) undermine God’s uniqueness as the only being that exists a se. Yet, I will argue that his view actually depends upon the reality of AOs. Furthermore, I will draw upon insights from phenomenology. By paying close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, I will argue that, contrary to Craig, we can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.

I will develop my argument first by sketching Craig’s nominalist views and his important use of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks. In so doing, I will draw extensively upon his essay, “Propositional Truth – Who Needs It?” to sketch the importance of his neutralist theory of reference and his deflationary view of truth, and how those relate to truth as correspondence. Second, I will draw upon Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method and apply it to examples of Craig’s concrete particulars. I will focus especially on Craig’s linguistic examples. My findings will serve as evidence against his nominalist anti-Platonism, and in favor of ante rem universals.

New essay on the ethics of Critical (Race) Theory

I recently had an essay, “Can Critical Theory, and Critical Race Theory, Ground Human Dignity, Justice, and Equality?” published in the Southern Baptist Journal of Theology. In it, I argue that “CT” and “CRT” seem to appeal to several moral absolutes, such as the treatment of all humans with dignity, respect, equality, and justice, as well as the protection of minority groups from oppression and domination by the majority group. Arguably, these positions presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable.

Yet, I will argue that CT and CRT have no basis for that presupposition, nor for its other moral stances, due to their rejection of essences, including that humans are made in God’s image. Indeed, our “common humanity,” which must be merely material ontologically, and our self-conceptualizations (or, senses of our identities) are inadequate bases for rights, leaving our moral value as just a result of hegemonic power, the very position that CT and CRT reject.

To help show this, first I will provide an overview of CT and then CRT, along with a general survey of their core ethical positions. Next, I will begin my assessment with a survey of some of these theories’ strengths. Then I will critically examine these theories’ abilities to preserve their key moral positions. Last, I will draw some conclusions particularly for Christians.

You can read that essay here.

New academic book:

Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge

My newest academic book has been published by Lexington. I examine the prospects of nominalism (trope, austere, and metalinguistic) to be able to preserve the qualities of reality. However, I argue that it cannot preserve them, and so we will not be able to have any knowledge (& we wouldn’t even exist).

I then apply my findings to a number of disciplines, such as science, ethics, religion, and several other disciplines.

Yet, surely we do know many things. Since that is so, there must be a different ontology that is true other than nominalism. I argue instead for a type of Platonic universals.

The book is a culmination and extension of my many essays and presentations on nominalism.

New philosophy book!

From Roman & Littlefield, the publisher’s website:

Constructivism dominates over other theories of knowledge in much of western academia, especially the humanities and social sciences. In Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge, R. Scott Smith argues that constructivism is linked to the embrace of nominalism, the theory that everything is particular and located in space and time. Indeed, nominalism is sufficient for a view to be constructivist.

However, the natural sciences still enjoy great prestige from the “fact-value split.” They are often perceived as giving us knowledge of the facts of reality, and not merely our constructs. In contrast, ethics and religion, which also have been greatly influenced by nominalism, usually are perceived as giving us just our constructs and opinions.

Yet, even the natural sciences have embraced nominalism, and Smith shows that this will undermine knowledge in those disciplines as well. Indeed, the author demonstrates that, at best, nominalism leaves us with only interpretations, but at worst, it undermines all knowledge whatsoever. However, there are many clear examples of knowledge we do have in the many different disciplines, and therefore those must be due to a different ontology of properties. Thus, nominalism should be rejected. In its place, the author defends a kind of Platonic realism about properties.

Critical Race Theory and Relativism

Introduction

Thus far, I have explored several issues with CRT, including its antiessentialism and materialism, and some key implications for ethics. Though Crits appeal to some core moral principles and virtues, such as the need to do justice, and the dignity and equality of all humans, morals on CRT cannot be intrinsically right or wrong. Nor is there an essence beyond their own constructs that grounds and defines these morals as what they are. Instead, these and other morals are their products, being just their interpretations.

There is another implication of their views for ethics, and we can see this most clearly by examining some of Ibram Kendi’s claims about antiracism and its relationship to cultural relativism.

Kendi on Antiracism and Cultural Relativism

Kendi writes that “a racist idea is any idea that suggests one racial group is inferior or superior to another racial group in any way.”[1] Kendi rejects the use of any arbitrary cultural standards as the universal measure of “success” or morality. Since he thinks there are no universal standards, measuring one racial group’s “standing” vis-à-vis another racial group is racist. Even more strongly, he asserts that cultural relativity is the essence of cultural antiracism. That is, “when we see cultural difference, we are seeing cultural difference – nothing more, nothing less.”[2]

Assessing Kendi’s Claim

Now, in light of Christianity, all humans are made in God’s image and thus are intrinsically valuable. In that respect, it is true that people of a given racial group are not inferior to those of another – all are equal in that crucial sense. Yet, on CRT’s antiessentialism, there is no room for appeals to essences that could ground our intrinsic value.

Furthermore, there may be more morals that are held in common across cultures than Kendi might realize. He and others I have been discussing stress the importance of equality, dignity, justice, respect, and more, all of which seem to be deeply held principles that people simply seem to know are valid. Consider a bit more in detail the importance of treating other humans with respect. How that core moral is worked out in a given cultural setting may look quite different than in another one. For instance, many Asian cultures have been deeply influenced by Confucian teachings, especially in terms of filial piety. So, children, even when adults, are expected to show a deep deference to the wishes of the family patriarch. Yet, in other cultures, respect may be shown quite differently. Eskimos honor and respect their elderly by sending them off on an ice flow. Here, there is a common moral principle, yet a difference in a secondary sense, in how that principle should be applied.

However, as we have seen on CRT, there is no room for any essences and universal principles. So, even the core morals that he and others appeal to, like justice, respect, and human dignity, and particulars to a given group. Moreover, these morals are just their interpretations. That means that the morals themselves for which they advocate are relative to a given group. However, that undermines the strength of his and others’ moral contentions, including that racism is wrong, and not just according to them, and justice is good, and so forth.

Since morals are just the products of particular groups, there is no basis why others should also believe and act as he and others do. Moreover, he and others lack a moral basis for critiquing some clearly racist groups, e.g., the Ku Klux Klan. Furthermore, even for Kendi, it does not seem to be the case that cultural differences are just cultural differences. Take the Jim Crow laws of the southern U. S. states. According to this claim of his, it seems those laws were just cultural, descriptive differences, yet that does not do justice to the fact that these laws were deeply immoral.

So, on Kendi’s view, even if a minority group believes that racism is wrong, but the majority doesn’t, there is no shared moral basis to show that the majority’s position is immoral. It would be immoral only to the minority, for its morals are relative to it. Nor would the majority would be immoral, for it constructed its morals as its members saw fit.

Instead, what Kendi and others need to make their many important moral claims stick is a grounding in universal morals, which have an essential nature. And, humans need to be intrinsically valuable due to their essential nature. Yet, since they have forsaken these grounds, his and other Crits’ arguments simply cannot sustain themselves.


[1] Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019), 20. Now, he prefers the description of being antiracist to being a Crit. Nevertheless, Kendi does seem to be embracing the core ideas of CRT, and so here I will consider him under that description.

[2] Kendi, 91.

Assessing Critical Race Theory’s Views about Knowledge

Introduction

Earlier, I described CRT’s approach to knowledge as one in which we are situated historically and contingently, such that no one can achieve a neutral, unbiased standpoint to gaze directly into reality and know it as such. Instead, to even have an experience requires interpretation. We may call this a kind of standpoint epistemology: we always gain knowledge from our particular, limited standpoints, which have been shaped by the aforementioned kinds of factors. Moreover, drawing from people like Nietzsche and Foucault, Crits hold that claims to have knowledge of objective truth really reflect our provisional interpretive grids and our wills to power.

Now, as I have noted earlier, there are some key strengths to their view. Here are two. First, Crits call our attention to actual, concrete human lives, and not abstractions, to see how actions and policies may harm them. The colorblind model can contribute to this effect, for it influences people to not notice the specific ways blacks and other minorities experience and suffer from racism by treating all people in a generalized way. Second, CRT helps researchers by calling attention to systems and institutions, to see ifthere are cases of racism therein.

But there also are some key problems, ones which threaten to undermine CRT itself and its contributions.

Problems with CRT’s Standpoint Epistemology

Let me start with a conceptual problem. If everything is interpretation, then it is not possible to even have an experience of the world without that involving interpretation. Now, I do think it is very important that we interpret our experiences. Yet, CRT is not saying just that. It espouses the view that all our experiences themselves are interpretation- (or theory-) laden. It is as though our interpretive lenses are glued to our faces, and so we cannot remove them.

Suppose this is the case, and we experience a situation in which it seems to us that a white police officer racially profiled a black driver. Yet, if everything is interpretation, we cannot access what actually is the case. We are so constrained by our situatedness that apparently all we can access is our interpretation thereof. But, then we face a further problem: we cannot even access that interpretation as it is, for it too is interpreted. Evidently, then, a second interpretation is involved. However, the same requirement repeats again and again, without any way in principle to stop a regress of interpretations. Knowledge, much less interpretations, cannot even get started, it seems.

If so, then it seems that this result undermines all of CRT’s claims whatsoever, for they too can be nothing other than its particular interpretations. So, it seems Crits could not even begin to form the core concepts of CRT, such as the realities of white supremacy, systemic racism, oppression of racial minorities, inequality, injustice, and more. Nor could we know that these concepts match up with reality. If so, why should others listen to Crits?

We also should consider how Crits tend to argue strenuously for their positions, and they supply good, descriptive support for many points. They want others (non-Crits) to see that their view is correct and should be adopted. However, if CRT cannot even begin to give us knowledge of how things really are in society, why should others give allegiance to its interpretations? Moreover, since CRT must be just a particular interpretation of justice, then it seems that national policy, which would apply to all people therein, should not be set on the basis of CRT.

Still more can be written against the presupposition that interpretation goes “all the way down.” It does not seem to be true descriptively. While it is true that we are shaped by a number of factors, which do contribute to our “interpretive grid,” it still seems possible (even actual) that we can learn to pay attention to other things that we may not have noticed before. J. P. Moreland explains that due to “attentive influence,” we can become habituated in terms of what we pay attention to, which also can lead to habituated interpretations. Yet, over time, we can fall into ruts and not pay attention to other phenomena. Still, we can develop new habits and begin to notice other things, even though it may be difficult.[1]

In my own case, I come from a Caucasian, middle-class family, and I did not experience racial profiling by police. Now, my growing up in that kind of home obviously is very different than one in which someone is a racial minority and has experienced much racial profiling. While I have not had the same experiences of such a person, it still seems I can seek to develop habits that would enable me to become more attentive to such incidents and how they happen. Part of that can occur by my getting to know and listening to stories of people of color who have experienced profiling, which I have tried to do even in my classes.  

Another issue is that according to CRT, all its views must be contingent; they are not necessary, a priori truths, for there are no essences. So, for example, when we come to Crits’ claims of widespread, systemic racism, we should not interpret this as an in-principle truth claim. Rather, to be consistent, it must be an a posteriori claim, one that would be known empirically and be so due to various contingencies.

Nevertheless, that is not how Crits always argue. For instance, consider Ibram Kendi’s claim that “to oppose reparations is to be racist. To support reparations is to be anti-racist.”[2] His wording suggests he intends it as a blanket, universal truth claim. Rhetorically, it is powerful and, if true, no one could oppose reparations and yet not be a racist. However, that is not true, for George Yancey, who himself is black, is a counterexample. Yancey provides reasons against reparations that are not racist and has worked toward racial reconciliation.[3] So even this claim is not true in principle. It, along with other CRT claims, has to be investigated and found to be true in fact. Moreover, like I argued above, this and other such claims can be only Crits’ interpretations, yet without being able to know if they are in line with reality.

Conclusion

This is but a brief assessment of issues related to CRT and standpoint epistemology. But in the next post, I will try to explore more issues from CRT for ethics.


[1] J. P. Moreland, “Two Areas of Reflection and Dialogue with John Franke,” Philosophia Christi 8:2:  307–12.

[2] Ibram X. Kendi, “There Is No Middle Ground on Reparations,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ibram-x-kendi-opposing-reparations-racist/592060/, June 19, 2019, accessed February 2, 2022. Note: while Kendi uses “antiracist” as a self-description, nonetheless his views do seem to draw deeply from CRT.

[3] George Yancey, Beyond Racial Gridlock: Embracing Mutual Responsibility (Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2006), 105–106.

More Problems for Critical Race Theory from Nominalism

Introduction

As I have discussed in this series, CRT is antiessentialist; it has no room for any essential natures. Why? If they were real, they would exist objectively, yet not be material, thus overriding CRT’s commitment to materialism. Also, an essence would be something natural and real beyond our constructs, which would thereby constrain our freedom to define our identities, i.e., our “true selves.”

On the other hand, if there were essences, then it seems that all humans actually would have an identical set of essential qualities present in each of them. Moreover, a moral virtue like justice would be identical essentially in just people. The moral principle that humans should be treated with dignity also should apply to all humans. These are examples of universals, one thing itself, and yet which can have many instances. And, when a human being exemplifies the virtue of justice, that human is a complex entity, being an individual human who also has the quality of justice.

However, without essences, there would not be any real, universal qualities. Instead, it seems those qualities would be particulars. This is a nominalist position, and since everything is particular on it, there are no complex entities; each and everything is simple – just one thing, and not the union of two or more things. Further, while we may call several similar traits by the same name or description (say, human, or justice), nonetheless those traits literally would be distinct because each one is particular. On this view, things are what they are in name only.

So, CRT is a nominalist view. What are some implications of that?

CRT and Nominalism

Let me being by probing the very assumptions of nominalism, to see if it can do the work that Crits think it can do for them and their theories. They are banking on it to support their many claims of injustice, inequality, and the domination by whites of minorities, to name a few. And, indeed, we can look into actual cases where such things have occurred. Yet, can nominalism sustain these charges?

Let’s focus on the core nominalist position, that everything is particular. So, despite how we may conceive of two or more things that seem similar, actually there do not exist any numerically identical qualities between any two things, whether cases of injustice or anything else. Plus, there are no complex entities; everything is simple (just one thing). So, to help illustrate that, let’s consider a person named Micah who is black, transgender, and courageous. By the way I have written out these descriptions, it might seem that there is Micah who has these qualities. If so, Micah would be a complex entity. But, on nominalism, Micah must be just one thing, so I will illustrate that by hyphens: Micah-a-courageous-black-transgender.

Notice that while we may conceive of Micah in these various ways, nonetheless there is just one “thing” here. Thus, all the “qualities” included in that description really do not exist; there is just the concrete object Micah-a-courageous-black-transgender. Moreover, pick any “quality”; it is identical to any other “quality” in the description, for in reality there is just one, simple thing, not a complex entity. So, for example, Micah’s being black ends up being identical to Micah’s being transgender or courageous. Furthermore, Micah’s being black is identical with the name Micah. If so, then we can eliminate all these other “qualities” and be left with just black. But that is a color that is not particularized. Instead, it seems to be an abstract, universal quality, which would be anathema to nominalism.

Alternatively, suppose we start with Micah’s being courageous. But, the same kinds of results happen; accordingly, there is no reason in principle why the other “qualities” cannot be eliminated without any loss in reality. At best we are left with an abstract object (one that is not particularized) that seems to be a universal, a result that undermines nominalism. At worst, there are no qualities whatsoever to any particular object.

In any of these cases, it seems nominalism cannot sustain in reality the thing or its qualities. But if that is the case, then it seems CRT’s core contentions cannot be sustained either, such as: there are real people who really are being oppressed by the white majority; racism is real, and there are real, systemic injustices; justice, dignity, and equality are good, whereas racism is wrong.

Indeed, even just taking nominalism literally as nameism, then all the qualities of CRT are just names (words) Crits have given to express their interpretations of actions in reality. But, based on nominalism, their interpretations are particular to them. If so, why should others accept their interpretations as the “gospel” truth? Literally, their meanings cannot be before others’ minds, for there are not even any interpretations – they too can be reduced away, just as we saw above.

There’s another reason why people literally cannot have these interpretations before their minds. It seems that ability presupposes what nominalism denies – that humans are not simple; instead, they are complex beings who can have different qualities present in them. Indeed, if not, how could someone be the same person throughout a reasoning process, who comes to change his or her mind from a more traditional view to that of CRT? Beforehand, on nominalism, that person could be characterized as that-traditionalist-person, but afterwards as a that-Crit-person. Yet, they are not identical, and so the person before that process occurred cannot be the same person as the one when it concluded.

Conclusion

So, applying nominalism to CRT, morals like justice, human dignity and equality, and racism’s wrongness are just what they are in name only, and names are particulars. Thus, we are not even talking about the same thing when two different groups discuss matters of justice. There is no essence to any of these morals, and so they (and people too) become nothing but the constructs of particular groups. It is no wonder, then, that with CRT’s strong influence in societal discourse, we are seeing more and more assertions of power to get what people want. After all, what else is left to turn to, if there are no essential, universal qualities (including meanings) that define what something is?

Ironically, though, while CRT advertises itself as the means by which people can be set free (liberated) from their oppression, actually it can do nothing of the sort. Based on its antiessentialism and nominalism, it leads us to think we can define reality, when in fact those two positions would undermine reality, including ourselves and our moral worth.