Introduction
In the previous entry, I surveyed some of the key tenets of critical race theory (CRT), including its appeal to hegemony, the concept of “domination by the ruling class and unconscious acceptance of that state of affairs by the subordinate group.”[1] I also sketched some key philosophical principles of CRT, including its rejection of essences and thus universals, which would be one thing (a truth, or a property) that can have many instances. Instead, they seem to embrace materialism, as well as the view that everything is particular, or nominal, being what it is in name only. Finally, Crits think we have been so shaped by our “situatedness” that no one knows how things really are, apart from our interpretive standpoints. Now, let’s turn to explore some key ethical positions of CRT.
Major Ethical Claims
As we already have seen, CRT holds that the oppression of humans is wrong. Moreover, CRT identifies this oppression with that of the majority group over the minority ones. Therefore, the oppressed groups must be liberated from their oppression.
Now, interestingly, Crits seem to argue for this view as though it simply is wrong as a matter of principle. For instance, they do not argue for this view on the basis of utilitarianism. If they did, it seems that principle could turn out to be false if there are cases where the net result of the good and bad consequences of some action by the majority actually benefits the greatest number of people. If so, then it could be obligatory for the majority to oppress the minorities.
Nor do they argue for it on the basis of ethical egoism, that one should act on the basis of one’s self-interest. If that were their basis, it would be difficult to argue that whites should give up their privilege and power if it is not in their self-interest. Also, they clearly do not appeal to natural law, for that would strongly imply essences which would constrain our ethical precepts.
So, it seems Crits appeal to oppression of humans (especially as a minority group) as wrong, period, which seems to be a deontological principle, one that simply is right in itself. They seem to reason similarly with many other key ethical claims, such as that all humans should be treated as equals and with dignity, respect, and justice. Moreover, they also seem to reason in the same way with their claim that humans should be free to define their “true selves” according to their own conceptualizations, and not that of the majority’s ideology. That is, it seems Crits presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable.
Why should that be the case? One answer given in the history of ethics has been that humans have an essential nature that defines them as being intrinsically valuable. A key source for that view is Christianity, on which humans are made in God’s image. As such, they are not to be mistreated, which would violate their essential moral worth. Another source has been Kant, who argued that humans are members of the kingdom of ends, and they should never be treated merely as a means to an end.
For CRT, since humans do not have an essence and are material beings, it seems some other basis is needed for its ethics. What might that be? Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic suggest that biological differences, such as hair texture and skin color, are superficial and not morally significant. Instead, there are morally relevant, higher-order traits common across races, such as “personality, intelligence, and moral behavior.”[2] Ibram Kendi, an antiracist whose views nonetheless draw extensively from CRT, agrees when he appeals to our “common humanity.”[3]
All these traits seem to fit within a materialist view of humans. Now, there are various ways naturalists who are materialists try to ground ethics. For example, Michael Ruse has argued that ethics is just a biological adaptation, and evolution has foisted upon us the illusion that morals are objectively real and independent of us.[4] James Rachels argued that what makes us valuable is not some essential nature we have. Nor is it our mere biological existence. Rather, it is our biographical life, the story that we tell about ourselves that gives our lives meaning and purpose.[5]
Yet both of these views do not fit with CRT’s evident deontological treatment of moral principles. Perhaps a more fitting option would be Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian view, on which we, while just matter, impose our moral concepts onto matter, willing them to be universalized to all humans.[6] Or, perhaps Erik Wielenberg’s Platonism about morals, yet within an overall materialist framework, might be an option for CRT. For him, it is a brute fact that moral virtues and principles exist as non-physical entities, though humans still are material beings. In his view, morals supervene upon physical facts.[7]
The Next Step
In my next blog, I will begin to assess CRT with a view toward ethics, starting with several of its strengths.
[1] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 175.
[2] Ibid., 9.
[3] Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019), 54, 198.
[4] Michael Ruse, “Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach,” in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (4th ed.; ed. Louis Pojman; Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002).
[5] James Rachels, The End of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See his discussion of Dax Cowart’s case.
[6] See her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.
[7] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).