Tag: nominalism

Article: “Propositions: Who Needs Them? Craig’s Nominalism Revisited”

This essay came out in Philosophia Christi 24:2 (2022). Here’s an abstract:

William Lane Craig has defended nominalist forms of “anti-Platonism” as normative for orthodox Christians. He believes Platonic abstract objects (AOs) undermine God’s uniqueness as the only being that exists a se. Yet, I will argue that his view actually depends upon the reality of AOs. Furthermore, I will draw upon insights from phenomenology. By paying close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, I will argue that, contrary to Craig, we can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.

I will develop my argument first by sketching Craig’s nominalist views and his important use of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks. In so doing, I will draw extensively upon his essay, “Propositional Truth – Who Needs It?” to sketch the importance of his neutralist theory of reference and his deflationary view of truth, and how those relate to truth as correspondence. Second, I will draw upon Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method and apply it to examples of Craig’s concrete particulars. I will focus especially on Craig’s linguistic examples. My findings will serve as evidence against his nominalist anti-Platonism, and in favor of ante rem universals.

New academic book:

Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge

My newest academic book has been published by Lexington. I examine the prospects of nominalism (trope, austere, and metalinguistic) to be able to preserve the qualities of reality. However, I argue that it cannot preserve them, and so we will not be able to have any knowledge (& we wouldn’t even exist).

I then apply my findings to a number of disciplines, such as science, ethics, religion, and several other disciplines.

Yet, surely we do know many things. Since that is so, there must be a different ontology that is true other than nominalism. I argue instead for a type of Platonic universals.

The book is a culmination and extension of my many essays and presentations on nominalism.

New philosophy book!

From Roman & Littlefield, the publisher’s website:

Constructivism dominates over other theories of knowledge in much of western academia, especially the humanities and social sciences. In Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge, R. Scott Smith argues that constructivism is linked to the embrace of nominalism, the theory that everything is particular and located in space and time. Indeed, nominalism is sufficient for a view to be constructivist.

However, the natural sciences still enjoy great prestige from the “fact-value split.” They are often perceived as giving us knowledge of the facts of reality, and not merely our constructs. In contrast, ethics and religion, which also have been greatly influenced by nominalism, usually are perceived as giving us just our constructs and opinions.

Yet, even the natural sciences have embraced nominalism, and Smith shows that this will undermine knowledge in those disciplines as well. Indeed, the author demonstrates that, at best, nominalism leaves us with only interpretations, but at worst, it undermines all knowledge whatsoever. However, there are many clear examples of knowledge we do have in the many different disciplines, and therefore those must be due to a different ontology of properties. Thus, nominalism should be rejected. In its place, the author defends a kind of Platonic realism about properties.

More Problems for Critical Race Theory from Nominalism

Introduction

As I have discussed in this series, CRT is antiessentialist; it has no room for any essential natures. Why? If they were real, they would exist objectively, yet not be material, thus overriding CRT’s commitment to materialism. Also, an essence would be something natural and real beyond our constructs, which would thereby constrain our freedom to define our identities, i.e., our “true selves.”

On the other hand, if there were essences, then it seems that all humans actually would have an identical set of essential qualities present in each of them. Moreover, a moral virtue like justice would be identical essentially in just people. The moral principle that humans should be treated with dignity also should apply to all humans. These are examples of universals, one thing itself, and yet which can have many instances. And, when a human being exemplifies the virtue of justice, that human is a complex entity, being an individual human who also has the quality of justice.

However, without essences, there would not be any real, universal qualities. Instead, it seems those qualities would be particulars. This is a nominalist position, and since everything is particular on it, there are no complex entities; each and everything is simple – just one thing, and not the union of two or more things. Further, while we may call several similar traits by the same name or description (say, human, or justice), nonetheless those traits literally would be distinct because each one is particular. On this view, things are what they are in name only.

So, CRT is a nominalist view. What are some implications of that?

CRT and Nominalism

Let me being by probing the very assumptions of nominalism, to see if it can do the work that Crits think it can do for them and their theories. They are banking on it to support their many claims of injustice, inequality, and the domination by whites of minorities, to name a few. And, indeed, we can look into actual cases where such things have occurred. Yet, can nominalism sustain these charges?

Let’s focus on the core nominalist position, that everything is particular. So, despite how we may conceive of two or more things that seem similar, actually there do not exist any numerically identical qualities between any two things, whether cases of injustice or anything else. Plus, there are no complex entities; everything is simple (just one thing). So, to help illustrate that, let’s consider a person named Micah who is black, transgender, and courageous. By the way I have written out these descriptions, it might seem that there is Micah who has these qualities. If so, Micah would be a complex entity. But, on nominalism, Micah must be just one thing, so I will illustrate that by hyphens: Micah-a-courageous-black-transgender.

Notice that while we may conceive of Micah in these various ways, nonetheless there is just one “thing” here. Thus, all the “qualities” included in that description really do not exist; there is just the concrete object Micah-a-courageous-black-transgender. Moreover, pick any “quality”; it is identical to any other “quality” in the description, for in reality there is just one, simple thing, not a complex entity. So, for example, Micah’s being black ends up being identical to Micah’s being transgender or courageous. Furthermore, Micah’s being black is identical with the name Micah. If so, then we can eliminate all these other “qualities” and be left with just black. But that is a color that is not particularized. Instead, it seems to be an abstract, universal quality, which would be anathema to nominalism.

Alternatively, suppose we start with Micah’s being courageous. But, the same kinds of results happen; accordingly, there is no reason in principle why the other “qualities” cannot be eliminated without any loss in reality. At best we are left with an abstract object (one that is not particularized) that seems to be a universal, a result that undermines nominalism. At worst, there are no qualities whatsoever to any particular object.

In any of these cases, it seems nominalism cannot sustain in reality the thing or its qualities. But if that is the case, then it seems CRT’s core contentions cannot be sustained either, such as: there are real people who really are being oppressed by the white majority; racism is real, and there are real, systemic injustices; justice, dignity, and equality are good, whereas racism is wrong.

Indeed, even just taking nominalism literally as nameism, then all the qualities of CRT are just names (words) Crits have given to express their interpretations of actions in reality. But, based on nominalism, their interpretations are particular to them. If so, why should others accept their interpretations as the “gospel” truth? Literally, their meanings cannot be before others’ minds, for there are not even any interpretations – they too can be reduced away, just as we saw above.

There’s another reason why people literally cannot have these interpretations before their minds. It seems that ability presupposes what nominalism denies – that humans are not simple; instead, they are complex beings who can have different qualities present in them. Indeed, if not, how could someone be the same person throughout a reasoning process, who comes to change his or her mind from a more traditional view to that of CRT? Beforehand, on nominalism, that person could be characterized as that-traditionalist-person, but afterwards as a that-Crit-person. Yet, they are not identical, and so the person before that process occurred cannot be the same person as the one when it concluded.

Conclusion

So, applying nominalism to CRT, morals like justice, human dignity and equality, and racism’s wrongness are just what they are in name only, and names are particulars. Thus, we are not even talking about the same thing when two different groups discuss matters of justice. There is no essence to any of these morals, and so they (and people too) become nothing but the constructs of particular groups. It is no wonder, then, that with CRT’s strong influence in societal discourse, we are seeing more and more assertions of power to get what people want. After all, what else is left to turn to, if there are no essential, universal qualities (including meanings) that define what something is?

Ironically, though, while CRT advertises itself as the means by which people can be set free (liberated) from their oppression, actually it can do nothing of the sort. Based on its antiessentialism and nominalism, it leads us to think we can define reality, when in fact those two positions would undermine reality, including ourselves and our moral worth.  

Panel Discussion with William Lane Craig & Rich Davis on Craig’s Nominalism & the Atonement, EPS 2020

I noticed from announcement by Reasonable Faith that RF has posted a link to the panel discussion held at the 2020 Evangelical Philosophical Society national conference.

Here is that link if you’d like to watch.

And, since then, my article about this topic came out in Theologica.

Making Sense of Morality: A Brief Assessment of MacIntyre’s Ethics

Various ethics terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Some Contributions

What should we make of MacIntyre’s proposals? His ethics focuses on the importance of good character by embodying moral virtues and being authentic. He also draws attention to the importance of community. And, he emphasizes the need for living out the virtues, and not merely engaging in abstract theorizing.

Broad Concerns

As we have seen, MacIntyre and other authors writing in the light of the postmodern turn embrace nominalism. Yet, we have seen its disastrous effects, leaving us without any qualities whatsoever. So, there are no people, no morals (not even our core ones), no world, etc. But surely this is false, and it destroys morality.

We also have surveyed issues with historicism, which ends up with no way to start making interpretations. Yet, are we really so situated that we cannot access reality directly? Now, surely no human is blind to nothing, and we cannot know something exhaustively. Surely we have our biases, too.

Yet, from daily life, it seems we can notice that we do access reality. For example, how do children learn to form concepts of apples? It seems it is by having many experiences of them. Then they can notice their commonalities, and they can form a concept on that basis. Then they can use that concept to compare something else they see (e.g., a tomato) and notice if it too is an apple or not. Adults do this, too, when they use phones to refill prescriptions, or enter their “PIN” for a debit card purchase.

It seems to be a descriptive fact that we can compare our concepts with things as they are, just as in that apple example. We also can adjust our concepts to better fit with reality. I think we can know this to be so, if we pay close attention to what is consciously before our minds.

However, how we attend to what we are aware of can reflect patterns. We can fall into ruts, noticing some things while not attending to others. As J. P. Moreland suggests, “situatedness functions as a set of habit forming background beliefs and concepts that direct our acts of noticing or failing to notice various features of reality” (Moreland, 311). But these habits do not preclude us from accessing reality.

Specific Concerns

Now, MacIntyre rejects the soul as the basis for one’s being the same person through change. For one, it would be an essence, and he seems to think humans are just bodies (Dependent Rational Animals, 6). Can the unity of one’s narrative meet this need?

For him, a narrative does not have an essence; it is composed of sentences that tell a person’s story. At any time, the narrative’s identity just is the bundle of sentences that are its members. However, if a new sentence is added, then the set of members has changed, and a new story has taken the old one’s place. Sadly, then, someone cannot grow in virtue or rationality on this view, for they do not maintain their identity through change.

Moreover, can we really see that one tradition is rationally superior to another? MacIntyre in banking on our ability to become bilingual. However, on his view, a person at any time is constituted by his or her narrative, and that in turn cannot be pried off from the tradition on which it is based. When a person immerses him or herself into another tradition to learn its language, that learning always will be done from the interpretive standpoint of the first tradition, by which that person has been formed. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, since that person is narratively “constituted” by the first tradition’s conceptual/linguistic framework. But, as that person “learns” that second language, new sentences should be added to that person’s narrative. Yet, if so, that person no longer is the same! So it becomes impossible to see the rational superiority of another tradition on his own views.

For Further Reading

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed.; Dependent Rational Animals; and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

J. P. Moreland, “Two Areas of Reflection and Dialogue with John Franke,” Philosophia Christi 8:2 (2006)

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 11

Making Sense of Morality: An Introduction to Postmodernism

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction to Postmodernism

Postmodernism is the last major kind of ethical views I will survey. Since it is post-modern, we will need to survey the modern era’s traits to which postmoderns are responding. In this essay, I will explore some of the historical and sociological factors leading to postmodernity, along with some key philosophical positions, too.

Historical, Sociological Influences

People date modernity’s beginning differently, but we can point to the rise of the Scientific Revolution with Gassendi’s and Hobbes’s influences in the 16th century, and the related scientific shifts then and in the 17th century. As a first trait, modernity was marked by a tendency to believe in the inevitability of progress from scientific discoveries, particularly from the theory of evolution. Due to this progress, humankind could get better and better.

In sharp contrast, in postmodernity, people are far less trusting of science’s inherent goodness. They have witnessed the 20th century, with two world wars, concentration camps, genocides, and mass murders. (Indeed, some mark the end of modernity with World War II.) Nazis used medical science to perpetrate gross experiments upon Jewish and other subjects. Science also provided the most destructive weapon yet developed, the nuclear bomb. So, people therefore are far less trusting that science and scientists are working just for peoples’ good.

Second, moderns had confidence in human reason, apart from divine revelation, to know universal truths. For example, witness Descartes’s (d. 1650) view of having certainty as a foundation for our beliefs. But, postmoderns stress the fallibility of human reason and its biases, and how all too often people use it to oppress others. Further, they reject knowledge of universal truths; we know truths from our particular standpoints (such as a community and its formative narrative).

Third, in modernity,people tended to trust their political and religious leaders. Yet, there have been many political scandals and cover-ups which have eroded that trust. Scandals also surfaced amongst religious leaders, such as accusations of molestation by Catholic priests. Many assume televangelists simply want money. In postmodernity,people have grown suspicious from the fallout of these betrayals of trust.

Fourth, moderns tend to think we can find objective, universal truths that apply to everyone. There are normative ways for all cultures to live. However, to postmoderns, that idea seems oppressive and imperialistic. 

Philosophical Influences 

We already have seen major shifts in western history from universals to nominalism; from mind-body dualism to materialism, and with both of these, a turn to empiricism; and from the view that we can know reality directly to historicism. But, postmodernity is not a complete rejection of what developed during modernity. Even though we have seen the above mentioned sociological and historical shifts in mindsets in postmodernity, postmoderns continue the modern focus on nominalism with its rejection of universals with their essences. For instance, they focus on knowledge being tied to particular “forms of life” (or communities, social groups). We are so shaped by our situatedness (the various social, familial, historical, cultural factors that shape how we interpret and understand life) that we cannot gaze directly into reality from a universal standpoint. Moreover, they tend to reject an essential nature to all humans, leading some toward materialism.

A key factor in postmodern thought is the turn to interpretation. This reflects a further turn than just the “turn to language.” We already have seen how Nietzsche placed much stress on how we use our words. Often, in modernity, the focus was on individual sentences that could be understood by anyone due to their universal meaning. However, for postmoderns, the focus is on holism: meaning is found in a whole – a form of life – which cannot be separated from its language and formative story, or narrative. And, we all speak different languages. Meanings then are a matter of how we use language (i.e., verbal and nonverbal behavior) in a given form of life, according to the “grammar” of that community.

Next, I will explore the views of a particular ethicist, Alasdair MacIntyre, who writes in light of the postmodern turn.

For Further Reading

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 8

Making Sense of Morality: Critical Theory Overview

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Naturalistic ethics remains a dominant moral approach in the west. But there are at least two other contemporary kinds of ethics. They are critical theory and its particular versions, as well as postmodernism. I will start with critical theory (CT), with a focus today on social justice. 

Overview of Critical Theory

Social justice has a long and venerable history, including efforts such as abolishing British and American slavery; caring for the vulnerable, such as the poor, widows, orphans, and minorities; and caring for the sick, such as through building hospitals. Today, however, there seems to be a “new kind” of social justice that focuses on issues such as (1) economic justice through the redistribution of resources; (2) freedom from discrimination due to one’s gender identity, and to be given positive rights on that basis; (3) environmental justice; and (4) racism and reparations.

Often, these contemporary efforts seem to be grounded in CT, which has a deep influence in the humanities, whether at secular or religious institutions. CT has spawned a number of specific studies, such as critical race, ethnic, legal, gender and queer, and cultural studies. It is having much influence in part because proponents are identifying some real injustices which should be addressed, such as racism, sexism, slavery, economic oppression, mistreatment of women, etc.

Based on several key philosophical positions, and Marxist-inspired thought, CT began in the “Frankfurt school.” That school included several key thinkers, such as Max Horkheimer (d. 1973), Theodor Adorno (d. 1969), and Herbert Marcuse (d. 1979). CT also was influenced by Antonio Gramsci (d. 1937), and all four were influenced significantly by Karl Marx (d. 1883).

Three Key Positions

Some of the reasons for the influence of CT is that it taps into accepted views we have seen. First, it accepts materialism: reality is made of matter, without any essences. Second, everything is particular (nominalism). Third, in terms of knowledge, it accepts historicism.

Historicism is like the view we saw in Kant, that we cannot know reality as it is in itself (i.e., directly). CT rejects knowledge of universal truths for all people at all times and places, for that would require a universal standpoint. Instead, historicists believe all knowledge is situated: it is socially-based and embedded in a given historical location and time. Our situatedness shapes how we interpret reality, and, like a set of lenses, we always experience and interpret reality through that interpretive framework. Yet, we cannot take off our glasses and get a direct, uninterpreted gaze into reality itself. Everything is our interpretation, drawn from our particular historical location.

Nietzsche (d. 1900) helped give rise to historicism, too. As a naturalist, he denied any essences. Also, due to nominalism, there are no literal identities between any two things; we construct things by taking them to be identical. Unlike Kant, there are no truths of reason (a priori). Indeed, things like the will are just words, the way we happen to talk. Even that we are the subjects of our thoughts is just an interpretation according to our grammatical formulae. Our teaching how to use words deceives us to think such things are real. Indeed, claims to know what is real just reflect our will to power, when actually all knowledge is perspectival.

Ethics 

Now, CT posits that there are two groups, the oppressors and the oppressed. A critical theory seeks to liberate people from domination and oppression and increase freedom in all their forms. Ethically, our fundamental duty is to liberate the oppressed. That is done by leveling power and redistributing resources (i.e., material solutions, since matter is what is real). This means an equality ofoutcomes, notopportunity.

Moreover, traditional western societies’ institutions oppress and alienate people from their true selves by disrespect, disapproval, and social inequalities. Instead, people are to be free to live as they want (e.g., define their own sexuality). For secular critical theorists, this liberation is accomplished in part by the state’s coercive power.

For Further Reading

Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Life, Knowledge, and Self-Consciousness,” and “Prejudices of Philosophers,” in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Patrick Gardiner

Roger Scruton, Fools, Frauds and Firebrands: Thinkers of the New Left

Making Sense of Morality: Problems with Naturalism 3

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Previously, I explored issues with Armstrong’s naturalistic kind of properties and how we cannot have knowledge on them. Now I will look at nominalism, which seems to be the most likely naturalistic view of properties. As Wilfrid Sellars (d. 1989) remarked, “A naturalist ontology must be a nominalistic ontology” (109). Yet, I will argue that nominalism undermines knowledge, and it will do so for naturalism, too, including in ethics. Yet that undercuts our clear knowledge of our core morals.

Nominalism

Unlike realists, who affirm the reality of universals, nominalists think that everything is particular. Literally, there are no identical qualities shared between two or more things. Moreover, every particular thing is just one thing (i.e., it is simple). But, how nominalist theories treat particulars varies.

For instance, on trope nominalism, there are many particular red color tropes in a bag of red delicious apples. While they may be analyzed as being exactly similar (yet not literally identical), they are discrete red tropes; e.g., red1, red2, red3, etc. An apple is many different tropes (e.g., a color trope, a sweetness trope, a round trope, etc.) that are bundled together

For austere nominalism, there are only concrete, particular objects. They are concrete, for they are located in space and time. A red delicious apple is just one thing, a red-sweet-round-apple. Finally, metalinguistic nominalism agrees with austere nominalism that there are only concrete objects. But, it holds that the “claims apparently about universals are really disguised ways of talking about linguistic expressions” (Loux, 46).

Assessment

As we have seen, nominalism has had a lengthy, deep influence on the west, including in ethics. I traced it back to Ockham, but since Hobbes, and running through Hume, Kant, Bentham, Mill, and almost every naturalist, nominalism has dominated philosophical thought, including ethics, as well as modern science.

Yet, is it true? Consider again that on it, regardless of the specific version, something is just one thing. It is not composed of two or more things. In contrast, realists hold that when a universal property (e.g., red) is instanced in an object (an apple), that instance of red is a universal that has been particularized. The instance is the union of two things, which makes it complex.

Now, on nominalism, it seems we treat an object as a particular something. That thing might be a property like red, or a concrete object like an apple or a word. Yet, we treat each one as though it is something that is particularized. Yet, in reality, they cannot be complex. So, then it seems that either one of these things, the “particularizer” (the individuator), or the thing itself, can be eliminated without any real loss.

Suppose we eliminate the particularizer – e.g., the “1” in red1. Yet, if we do that, then we seem left with just red, the color itself, and it is not particularized. But that is what realists claim to be the case, that red is an abstract entity that is particularized when it enters into the being of some object, like an apple. So, eliminating the particularizer spells the end of nominalism.

Instead, suppose we eliminate the quality (or object). But, then we are left with just a particularizer (here, the “1”) which individuates nothing. That, however, makes no sense, for we always would ask, “one what?” In this case, the dire result is that there are no qualities or objects in reality. But, that means nominalism undermines reality.

Since nominalism maintains that every particular is just one thing, we can take either route without any difference in reality. In that case, we can take the latter option, and so we see that nominalism cannot preserve any qualities in reality whatsoever. There would not be any people, animals, plants, beliefs, and certainly not any morals. Nominalism undermines our core morals, as well as morality altogether. Moreover, it undermines naturalism as false.

For Further Reading

Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars

Michael Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed.

Wilfrid Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology

R. Scott Smith,“Tropes and Some Ontological Prerequisites for Knowledge,” Metaphysica 20:2 (2019)