Tag: knowledge

Can we have knowledge if naturalism is true?

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Here’s one of them. One of my biggest interests is to see what needs to be real for us to have knowledge. One key focus for me has been to see if we can have knowledge, given naturalism.

Here, I give a talk on that subject, using the views of a leading philosopher of neuroscience, Daniel Dennett. I try to show that we cannot have knowledge based on naturalism. I also have written on this topic in (e.g.) Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality: Testing Religious Truth-claims.

I think this is an important line of argument we can use to help show naturalism is false. For, there are many things we do in fact know. But that must be due to the reality of a very different worldview.

New academic book:

Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge

My newest academic book has been published by Lexington. I examine the prospects of nominalism (trope, austere, and metalinguistic) to be able to preserve the qualities of reality. However, I argue that it cannot preserve them, and so we will not be able to have any knowledge (& we wouldn’t even exist).

I then apply my findings to a number of disciplines, such as science, ethics, religion, and several other disciplines.

Yet, surely we do know many things. Since that is so, there must be a different ontology that is true other than nominalism. I argue instead for a type of Platonic universals.

The book is a culmination and extension of my many essays and presentations on nominalism.

New philosophy book!

From Roman & Littlefield, the publisher’s website:

Constructivism dominates over other theories of knowledge in much of western academia, especially the humanities and social sciences. In Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge, R. Scott Smith argues that constructivism is linked to the embrace of nominalism, the theory that everything is particular and located in space and time. Indeed, nominalism is sufficient for a view to be constructivist.

However, the natural sciences still enjoy great prestige from the “fact-value split.” They are often perceived as giving us knowledge of the facts of reality, and not merely our constructs. In contrast, ethics and religion, which also have been greatly influenced by nominalism, usually are perceived as giving us just our constructs and opinions.

Yet, even the natural sciences have embraced nominalism, and Smith shows that this will undermine knowledge in those disciplines as well. Indeed, the author demonstrates that, at best, nominalism leaves us with only interpretations, but at worst, it undermines all knowledge whatsoever. However, there are many clear examples of knowledge we do have in the many different disciplines, and therefore those must be due to a different ontology of properties. Thus, nominalism should be rejected. In its place, the author defends a kind of Platonic realism about properties.

Making Sense of Morality: Problems with Naturalism I

Various ethical terms
Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Now that we have completed a survey of several versions of naturalistic ethics, we should consider a few big-picture issues for naturalism. Should we accept it as true? When we looked at Singer’s views, I raised one issue: it seems there is no sameness of one’s personal identity on naturalism. But, without that, there are no continuing subjects. Here, I will argue that on naturalism, we will lose all knowledge of reality because there are no essences.

Daniel Dennett and Knowledge on Naturalism

Dennett (b. 1942) is a leading philosopher of neuroscience. He denies there are any real, immaterial, “mental” states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, desires). Nor is there any real intentionality, the ofness or aboutness of mental states.

Let me explain intentionality more. For many, it is a property of thoughts, beliefs, observations, concepts, meanings, and more. It seems these always are of or about something, even if that thing does not obtain in reality (e.g., Pegasus). I can think of Pegasus, even though there isn’t a winged horse. So, it seems intentionality would not be physical. If it were, it seems that having a thought about something would require that thing exists in order to physically cause that thought in me.

Instead, for Dennett, natural selection is a blind process without any intentionality, goals, or real thoughts. There is only physical stuff, including brains that process our sensory inputs. There are just brain states, patterns of physical forces, and behavior that we take (or interpret) to be about something, though they really aren’t. These interpretations are the result of many of the brain’s distributed “takings.”

Consistently, Dennett also denies any essences exist. But, if they did, they would be something non-physical that’s true of something (e.g., a person, a thought, or a meaning) just because of what kind of thing it is – i.e., due to its essence. If real, Dennett says there could be a “deeper fact” beyond just behavior of what our thoughts (or beliefs, experiences, etc.) are really about.

But, since they are not real, we are left with just interpreting behavior by adopting a tactic he calls the intentional stance (IS). Using it, we treat a frog, human, or chess-playing computer as if it were an intentional system. The IS is “the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent” (Dennett, 239). We attribute intentions to the thing, to help predict its behavior.

But, Dennett admits that if intrinsic essences were real, there could be real, intrinsic meanings to behaviors such as speech, writings, and gestures. He also recognizes the importance of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism, which also denies essences. Without an intrinsic meaning in the text, its meaning is just our interpretation. For Dennett, thoughts and speech are brain-writings, which are subject to interpretation, just like any other text.

Assessment

But, what then should we make of naturalism’s claims about the objectively real world being physical, that we are just our bodies, and that naturalism is true? At best, these are nothing but interpretations. Indeed, all our scientific observations and all our beliefs are just interpretations. But, of what? If everything is interpretation, we seem to face an infinite regress, without a way to even get started with accessing reality itself.

Additionally, interpretations also seem to be of or about something. That is, they too seem to have intentionality. But, without that being real, there are no interpretations. So, it seems that on naturalism (and not just Dennett’s version), there are not even any interpretations, or conceptualizations. Yet, without concepts, there are no beliefs, for beliefs require concepts. And without beliefs (which also are about things), there is no knowledge of the facts of reality. That knowledge is justified true belief – but without beliefs, there is no knowledge. So, naturalism cannot give us knowledge.

But, surely there are many things about reality that we do know. And so, naturalism must be false.

For Further Reading

Daniel C. Dennett, “Dennett, Daniel C.,” A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, ed. Samuel Guttenplan; see also his The Intentional Stance

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 6