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Critical Race Theory and the Undermining of Human Dignity

Introduction

In a previous post, I argued that though I have not seen Crits (those who advocate for CRT) claim explicitly that humans are intrinsically valuable, nonetheless it is evident that they presuppose it. For instance, Ibram X. Kendi argues that due to their “common humanity,” people of color simply should be treated with justice, dignity, and equality.[1] Crits also appeal to oppression of humans (especially of minority groups) as wrong, and they seem to treat this as a deontological principle that is right in itself. Moreover, they seem to argue very similarly with their positions that all humans should be treated with equality, respect, dignity, and justice, as well as that humans should be free to self-define (auto-nomos) their “true selves.” That self-definition is not to be according to the majority’s ideology but their own particular conceptualizations.

Yet, intrinsic value means that we are valuable simply in virtue of the kind of being we are (human), and not based upon our functional abilities, our value in the eyes of others, or even how we conceive of ourselves. This requires essences, that we are valuable due to our essential nature. However, CRT also is explicitly antiessentialist. What then are the implications of CRT for preserving human dignity, value, etc.?

CRT and the Basis for Law

CRT seeks to shift power away from the dominant group to peoples who have been marginalized and oppressed. In part, this happens by their defining their “true selves.” In turn, these conceptions, or identities, become the basis for law and public policy. While for the moral reasons noted above, such appeals seem to presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable, they do not attempt to ground rights in that basis. Instead, legislation and judicial rulings attempt to give rights and dignity to people based on their chosen, constructed identities.

Now, I am not surprised by their not grounding rights and dignity in the intrinsic value of humans, for in the west we largely have given up on the reality of essential natures, at least as far as law and policy goes. Why? Many take as axiomatic that the fact-value split is right. According to it, science, which uses empirically verifiable means, has the “corner of the market” on giving us knowledge of facts. But, we cannot know immaterial things like essences with our five senses, so those do not count as real. Moreover, to be “orthodox,” science needs to be Darwinian, which also rejects a need for essential natures.

Relegated to the value side are things that seem to be what science cannot verify, which includes religion, ethics, and metaphysical things like souls and essential natures. Instead of being things we can know are real, they are just opinions, preferences, or our constructs. Without recourse to an objectively real, intrinsic value of humans, another basis is needed to attempt to secure human dignity, equality, etc. Since such things are our constructs, and, on CRT, the oppressed need to be liberated from their oppression, the clear alternative is to base rights and morals in our chosen, constructed identities.  

We should notice how this view stands in contrast to the mindset adopted in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Here, these rights cannot be taken away because they apply to all humans due to the kind of thing we are. Moreover, these rights are objectively real; they are not human products. In short, these are natural rights, due to our nature as humans.

We can witness principles found in CRT also at work in what is called the “new dignity jurisprudence” (NDJ). Both CRT and NDJ hold that law is a matter of power, and not a recognition and application of substantive, universal morals with their essential natures to humans with their natures. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes helped express and champion this view in law when he claimed that “[a] law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the community even if it will take us to hell.”[2] Since on both CRT and NDJ law is basically power, the oppressed should be liberated from their oppression by seizing power.

Like CRT, NDJ finds “a deep connection between dignity and the autonomy of the inner self that seeks to realize its potential through a preferred lifestyle.”[3] According to Angus Menuge, we can see this development in American jurisprudence through two key Supreme Court cases. The first one, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, held that “at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning ….”[4] Importantly, here, dignity is not intrinsic to all humans; rather, it varies to “the degree to which the state allows people to make their own choices,” which makes it “an entitlement of our liberty.” That is, we have a right to define our “true selves,”[5] lest we be harmed.

In the second case, Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that “the state’s constitutional obligation  to uphold equal protection under the law means that it must strike down any laws that humiliate or demean people by denying them the recognition and benefits available to other citizens, because of their chosen lifestyle.”[6] According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, denying same-sex couples the right to marry “would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood.”[7] Here, personhood, as well as dignity, is not intrinsic to humans.

NDJ utilizes five principles which align very closely with CRT. First, due to our autonomy, “all people have the right to choose [without limitation or interference] a preferred lifestyle provided it does not infringe on the autonomy of others.”[8] That is, as long as we do not harm others’ autonomy, our right to self-definition is secure. Second, we self-define our identities by “certain fundamental choices about how we live our lives.”[9] Together, these align with CRT’s principle of autonomy to become our “true selves.” 

Third, we are entitled to privacy, for society has “no right to interfere with one’s personal choices about how to live and who one is.”[10] Fourth, society should not infringe on “one’s fundamental rights of autonomy and self-definition”; doing so humiliates that person and inflicts “dignitary wounds.”[11] Fifth, the law can, and should, construct human dignity by “creating a private sphere in which autonomy and self-definition can operate without the humiliation of social intrusion.”[12]

CRT and the Undermining of Human Value

There is a good aspect to CRT’s influence on law and public policy. Crits rightly recognize that many groups (and not just racial ones) have been discriminated against and need protection. As just a few examples, we can think of African Americans, Native Americans, and women. Of course, CRT focuses on systemic racism and injustices, and while it draws our attention to the possibilities of such discrimination at work, we should not assume a priori that that is indeed the case in any given set of circumstances. (Why not? If we did, we would be importing an essentialist claim into CRT, namely, that systems are in principle racist. But that would make CRT internally contradictory.) We need to investigate and see if that is the case, and if so, then to bring remedies.

However, there is something very important to notice. On the one hand, CRT presupposes that humans are intrinsically valuable, as are certain morals (justice, human dignity and equality, etc.). On the other, CRT needs essences to preserve these intrinsic (essential) qualities. Yet, CRT rejects essences. This means that on CRT, human value, as well as the goodness and rightness of these morals, is nothing but our constructs. Our self-conceptions are what make us valuable. Thus, simply being a member of a common humanity is not sufficient to be valuable. Furthermore, several humans, such as the unborn, infants, people suffering from dementia, and those with severe mental illnesses, may not have self-concepts and thus would not be valuable. If so, it seems they could be mistreated, and perhaps even be killed.

That our value is just a construct also fits with CRT’s nominalism, too, for, as that term suggests, morals, including human value, is in name only. They are just a matter of the words to frame our conceptualizations. But, as the saying goes, talk is cheap, and without a deeper grounding for these morals, CRT cannot sustain them, regardless of the words we employ.

Moreover, according to CRT’s use of standpoint epistemology, all we know is from our limited, historically situated standpoints. We cannot “rise above” them and somehow gain a vantage point from which we can know what is objectively real and true. Instead, everything we claim to know is just our interpretation. But, of what? If somehow we cannot know what is indeed the case in reality, even if not exhaustively but at least accurately, then it seems we are working only with our interpretations. Moreover, these interpretations are just particular to given people groups, according to their interpretive “lenses.” But, if so, there is no objective truth of the matter, even of the many claims of CRT. Thus, why should one group (even the dominant group) give heed to the interpretations of another group, if it does not fit the former’s interpretive grid?

So, CRT (as well as NDJ) cannot preserve the very values and morals that Crits and others rightly presuppose – that humans are intrinsically valuable, and morals like justice are good. Indeed, taken consistently, on CRT humans are not intrinsically valuable; they have value only insofar as they conceive of themselves as valuable. Yet, Crits do not seem to live consistently with this view. They do not affirm the moral equality of all self-conceptualizations. For example, if someone on a job were to choose to self-define as a white supremacist, very likely that person would be ordered to take racial sensitivity training and perhaps be fired.

Moreover, why should others value someone’s (or some group’s) identity? On CRT, it is not because that group’s members are intrinsically valuable; rather, it seems it is because that without it, others are inflicting dignity wounds on those members. Indeed, this is why CRT leads to a demand for affirmation, and not mere tolerance, of someone’s chosen identity. It is a positive rights claim, not a negative one. For without such positive affirmation, we wound their very dignity.

Practically speaking, what does CRT imply? As mere humans, we are not intrinsically valuable. Yet, we know we deeply need it and even crave it, so much so that Crits cannot get away from it – they even presuppose we are intrinsically valuable. But, on CRT, that is a myth. So, we must (desperately) create our own value, and we must require that others affirm our construct of dignity, lest we be exposed as not having any.

Conclusion for Law and Public Policy

This result is incredibly ironic and sad. In law and policy making, we want to protect minorities from immoral discrimination, yet often we are doing so on the basis of CRT and NDJ’s principles. These principles hold that “we are valuable because we are ___,” where we get to fill in the blank with our chosen identities. Two brief examples include the Obergefell decision, and a recent bill that would allow children who self-identify as transgender to come to California to transition while being protected as wards of the court, even without parental approval.[13] They are members of an oppressed minority, and their parents (if they oppose those actions) could well be seen as the oppressors. Moreover, we must affirm these children’s self-concept(s). Yet, this basis can never preserve our dignity and equality, for it substitutes our constructs for intrinsic value. And, if people construct their value, others can deconstruct it and take it away.

[1] Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019), 54, 198. While Kendi prefers the label “antiracist,” nonetheless I think his views draw deeply from CRT.

[2] Letter from Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, 1914, in Albert Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 59.

[3] Angus Menuge, “The New Dignity Jurisprudence: A Critique,” in Barry W. Bussey and Angus J. L. Menuge, eds., The Inherence of Human Dignity: Law and Religious Liberty Vol. 2 (London: Anthem Press, 2021), 75.

[4] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), § 851.

[5] Menuge, 76.

[6] Ibid., 77.

[7] Anthony Kennedy, majority opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 14-556 U. S. Supreme Court. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf, 19 (italics added).

[8] Menuge, 78-79 (italics added).

[9] Menuge, 79.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] See https://twitter.com/Scott_Wiener/status/1516475367845892099?ref_src=twsrc%255Etfw%257Ctwcamp%255Etweetembed%257Ctwterm%255E1516475367845892099%257Ctwgr%255E%257Ctwcon%255Es1_&ref_url=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.them.us%252Fstory%252Fcalifornia-trans-refuge-bill-safe-haven-trans-youth. Accessed August 11, 2022.

Assessing Critical Race Theory on Human Nature and Morals

Introduction

Previously, I mentioned several key morals that Crits rightly recognize as good and right, such as justice is good, humans should be treated with dignity and equality, and racism is wrong. These are important strengths of CRT.

The Nature of Humans and Morals

Yet, CRT also presupposes that there are no essences. Instead, we are material beings in a material world. So, despite Crits’ evident presupposition that humans should be treated as intrinsically valuable, there is nothing that exists intrinsically, or essentially, to being human that defines the kind of thing we are, or how we should live. That is, there is no grounding for their presupposition. Also, on CRT, moral principles and qualities do not have an essence that defines them. Instead, morals end up being our constructs. So, for instance, justice does not have an essence to it that we need to discover and with which we align ourselves. Rather, justice is nothing but a matter of our interpretation.

Now, if justice (as well as other morals) had an essence, then there could be an identical quality that literally is in common to all instances of just people and actions. But, since there is no such essence on CRT, there is no such thing as justice per se, one quality for which we all should strive to achieve and embody. There are no morals that are true for all people in all times and places and exist apart from our constructs. Instead, morals are particulars, which shows CRT’s dependence on nominalism.

  • Let’s contrast this stance with a biblical one about humans, morals, and their natures. Biblically, humans are made in God’s image, which defines us as the kind of thing we are in contrast to any other created thing (cf. Gen 1:21 & 26). So, to be an image bearer is to be human; it is our essential nature. Moreover, the particular essence of an individual human is that human’s soul.[1] Moreover, Scripture presupposes that all humans bear God’s image, such that it is one set of qualities that can be in many instances. That is, it is a universal.
  • Since we are made in God’s image, there are moral qualities and principles that are normative for us. Scripture informs us that we are to become like Christ (e.g., Rom 8:29; Eph 5:1-2; Gal 5:22-23), which includes being like Him morally. These qualities are those of Jesus which also are appropriate for us as image bearers. And, each such moral quality is a one-in-many, i.e., a universal. Moreover, there is an essence to them that defines them as what they are; e.g., justice is not identical to love, even though they are to be partners in action. Finally, they are objectively real; they are valid and exist, whether or not any of us believes them to be so. So, they are not our products.

Some Initial Implications

First, if there are no essences to these key morals, then justice, equality, dignity, and even oppression are up to people to define as they see best. Of course, how one group defines them may vary from another, for these are just a group’s particular constructs. But, this will perpetuate inevitably the very thing Crits decry – the hegemony of the powerful. Indeed, it seems on CRT that morals can only be power moves.

Second, since humans and the rest of reality is just made of matter, it seems CRT faces the well-known problems that afflict other views that accept that same kind of ontology. For instance, physicalist views face the problem that in a physical world, it seems humans’ character and actions can be exhausted descriptively. Yet, morality is about normativity – how we ought to live and treat others. In other words, such views, including CRT, face the problem of how we can derive the moral ought from what is the case physically.

Now, some, such as Christine Korsgaard, have tried to address this problem by claiming we can impose our moral concepts onto matter.[2] Drawing upon Kant and John Rawls, she thinks we can will that our moral maxims (plans of action) be universalized for all people. Nonetheless, the end result is that we construct these morals, which still are particulars ontologically (though we will that they apply to all). They do not have essential natures, and so they are subject to our conceptualizations, with the same problem I just considered above.

The Next Steps

There are many more implications of CRT’s ontology for humans and morals, and I will continue this discussion in the next blog. I will look at what I think is a crucial issue: the lack of our intrinsic value and how that leads to many (futile) attempts today to secure our moral worth.

[1] Here, I will not investigate some Christians’ claims that we are basically physical beings without a soul. I have done so elsewhere, such as in my chapter, “Physicalism and Sanctification,” in Christian Physicalism, eds. Joshua Farris and Keith Loftin (Lexington Books, 2018). That essay addresses the prospects of becoming like Christ on a physicalist anthropology.

[2] See her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also my discussion of her views in my In Search of Moral Knowledge (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2014).

Critical Race Theory: Some Key Strengths

Introduction

Previously, I have been giving background information about critical race theory (CRT), and last time I explored some of the main ethical principles that Crits (critical race theorists) embrace, such as we should treat humans with dignity, justice, and respect. Moreover, oppressing humans is wrong, and we should liberate the oppressed from their oppression. I also argued that Crits seem to presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable. Now, I will begin to assess CRT, starting with some of its key contributions.

Strength # 1: The Validity of Several Core Morals

A great strength of CRT is its recognition of several core morals that we simply know are valid, and yet there have been too many times and cases where these principles have been violated. But, our clear recognition as a society that such violations have happened (and still happen) helps to underscore the validity of these morals. It is not the case that people need to see reasons why humans should be treated justly; rather, they simply know that is true and therefore should call for justice to happen in cases of injustice.

There is a corollary to this important observation. Crits argue that race is basically a social construct. As Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo argue, “the differences we see with our eyes, such as hair texture and eye color or shape, are superficial and emerged over time as humans adapted to geography.”[1] Thus, such traits are morally irrelevant. Instead, we all share in a common humanity, and peoples of all races should be treated uprightly.

Strength # 2: Its Descriptive Usefulness and Accuracy

A second and highly significant strength of CRT is its focus on systems and institutions and how they can perpetuate racism. That is, CRT provides a tool for researchers to investigate and see if there are examples of institutional racism. Of course, this usefulness would not exist if there are indeed no cases of systemic racism. Yet, Crits have worked hard to try to show that there are (many) examples.

Here are a few cases. Historically there are the examples of slavery, the Dred Scott decision, and Jim Crow laws. There also is the case of the U. S. Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Loan Program. Though it was created to help working-class people buy a home at lower interest rates, it discriminated against black applicants who wanted to buy in predominately white neighborhoods. In turn, this course of action helped foster “white flight” from inner cities.[2]

So, by even bringing systemic racism to our awareness, CRT can help us see if such discrimination is at work in given situations so we can address it.

Strength # 3: Its Important Focus upon Particulars that Affect Peoples’ Lives

CRT also calls us to examine the impacts of our ethics and policies upon actual lives, to see if we are mistreating anyone. This attention to particular lives is important, for an ethic that is so preoccupied with universal prescriptions that are divorced from how people actually live is distorted. For instance, the colorblind model can influence people to not notice the specific ways blacks and other minorities experience and suffer from racism, for that model encourages us treat all people in a generalized way.

Moreover, CRT emphasizes the need to listen to the stories of people of color, for they have their own experiences and perspectives. In so doing, whites can begin to notice how their perspectives are shaped by their own “situating factors.” Indeed, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic make an important observation that “whites do not see themselves as having a race but as being, simply, people. They do not believe that they think and reason from a white viewpoint but from a universally valid one – ‘the truth’ – what everyone knows.”[3]

Strength # 4: A Corrective to an Overemphasis by Some Christians on Living Mainly for the Afterlife

A final contribution, specifically for Christians, is that CRT helps by calling attention to the need to do justice in this life, which is a crucial component of biblical ethics.[4] Yet, various people have argued that many evangelicals so emphasize the importance of getting peoples’ souls into heaven that they also do not see the need to address current evils from oppression.[5] As Dallas Willard has noted, many live as though they basically need to “manage sin” while awaiting Christ’s return or their death so they go to heaven.[6] So, this emphasis of CRT is helpful for Christians to fulfill their biblical, ethical obligations to do justice (Mic 6:8).

The Next Move

Now that I have surveyed some strengths of CRT, I will turn to begin some assessment of its key positions.

[1] Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? 2nd ed., in Multicultural Education Series, ed. James A. Banks (New York: Teachers College Press, 2017), 121.

[2] George Yancey, Beyond Racial Gridlock: Embracing Mutual Responsibility (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 91. See also Sensoy and DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? 151.

[3] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 91-92.

[4] E.g., see Lev 25:35, Is 58:4-10, and Ps 112:4-5, 9 regarding the voluntary, compassionate redistribution of resources for those who could not support themselves; Ps 58, for the punishment of evildoers on the earth; and 1 Kings 18:20-40; 2 Kings 17:8, as well as 2 Chron 33:1-13, for God’s punishment on Israel and Judah for not living uprightly in this life.

[5] For a discussion of the views of former leaders of the emerging church, see my Authentically Emergent: In Search of a Truly Progressive Christianity (Eugene: Cascade, 2018), chs. 1 and 3.

[6] See his The Divine Conspiracy (New York: Harper, 1999), ch. 2. He thinks gospels of “sin management” characterize both liberal and conservative Christians.

Critical Race Theory & Its Ethical Stances

Introduction

In the previous entry, I surveyed some of the key tenets of critical race theory (CRT), including its appeal to hegemony, the concept of “domination by the ruling class and unconscious acceptance of that state of affairs by the subordinate group.”[1] I also sketched some key philosophical principles of CRT, including its rejection of essences and thus universals, which would be one thing (a truth, or a property) that can have many instances. Instead, they seem to embrace materialism, as well as the view that everything is particular, or nominal, being what it is in name only. Finally, Crits think we have been so shaped by our “situatedness” that no one knows how things really are, apart from our interpretive standpoints. Now, let’s turn to explore some key ethical positions of CRT.

Major Ethical Claims

As we already have seen, CRT holds that the oppression of humans is wrong. Moreover, CRT identifies this oppression with that of the majority group over the minority ones. Therefore, the oppressed groups must be liberated from their oppression.

Now, interestingly, Crits seem to argue for this view as though it simply is wrong as a matter of principle. For instance, they do not argue for this view on the basis of utilitarianism. If they did, it seems that principle could turn out to be false if there are cases where the net result of the good and bad consequences of some action by the majority actually benefits the greatest number of people. If so, then it could be obligatory for the majority to oppress the minorities.

Nor do they argue for it on the basis of ethical egoism, that one should act on the basis of one’s self-interest. If that were their basis, it would be difficult to argue that whites should give up their privilege and power if it is not in their self-interest. Also, they clearly do not appeal to natural law, for that would strongly imply essences which would constrain our ethical precepts.

So, it seems Crits appeal to oppression of humans (especially as a minority group) as wrong, period, which seems to be a deontological principle, one that simply is right in itself. They seem to reason similarly with many other key ethical claims, such as that all humans should be treated as equals and with dignity, respect, and justice. Moreover, they also seem to reason in the same way with their claim that humans should be free to define their “true selves” according to their own conceptualizations, and not that of the majority’s ideology. That is, it seems Crits presuppose that humans are intrinsically valuable.

Why should that be the case? One answer given in the history of ethics has been that humans have an essential nature that defines them as being intrinsically valuable. A key source for that view is Christianity, on which humans are made in God’s image. As such, they are not to be mistreated, which would violate their essential moral worth. Another source has been Kant, who argued that humans are members of the kingdom of ends, and they should never be treated merely as a means to an end.

For CRT, since humans do not have an essence and are material beings, it seems some other basis is needed for its ethics. What might that be? Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic suggest that biological differences, such as hair texture and skin color, are superficial and not morally significant. Instead, there are morally relevant, higher-order traits common across races, such as “personality, intelligence, and moral behavior.”[2] Ibram Kendi, an antiracist whose views nonetheless draw extensively from CRT, agrees when he appeals to our “common humanity.”[3]

All these traits seem to fit within a materialist view of humans. Now, there are various ways naturalists who are materialists try to ground ethics. For example, Michael Ruse has argued that ethics is just a biological adaptation, and evolution has foisted upon us the illusion that morals are objectively real and independent of us.[4] James Rachels argued that what makes us valuable is not some essential nature we have. Nor is it our mere biological existence. Rather, it is our biographical life, the story that we tell about ourselves that gives our lives meaning and purpose.[5]

Yet both of these views do not fit with CRT’s evident deontological treatment of moral principles. Perhaps a more fitting option would be Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian view, on which we, while just matter, impose our moral concepts onto matter, willing them to be universalized to all humans.[6] Or, perhaps Erik Wielenberg’s Platonism about morals, yet within an overall materialist framework, might be an option for CRT. For him, it is a brute fact that moral virtues and principles exist as non-physical entities, though humans still are material beings. In his view, morals supervene upon physical facts.[7]

The Next Step

In my next blog, I will begin to assess CRT with a view toward ethics, starting with several of its strengths.

[1] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 175.

[2] Ibid., 9.

[3] Ibram X. Kendi, How to be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019), 54, 198.

[4] Michael Ruse, “Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach,” in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (4th ed.; ed. Louis Pojman; Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002).

[5] James Rachels, The End of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See his discussion of Dax Cowart’s case.

[6] See her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4-5.

[7] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Ethics and Critical Race Theory – General and Philosophical Positions

Introduction

In previous posts, I discussed the role of suspicion in critical race theory (CRT), and there I included the influences of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. I also touched on the CRT analysis that power structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy. Moreover, critical legal studies helped reinforce the view that law is mainly about power, not morals. Michel Foucault argued that the dominant group’s power is transmitted and normalized through institutions, and radical feminism contributed how power relates to the construction of social roles, which results in largely unnoticed patterns of domination.

Now, I will explore some more key positions of CRT, starting with some general ones. Then I will look at some key philosophical views, including what is real, and how we know things. In the next blog entry, I will look at several key ethical stances of CRT.

Additional, General Tenets of CRT

First, racism is common, and it is not limited to individuals. It also is systemic, which is the focus of CRT. Second, there is racial disparity: there are differences in outcomes (such as for health and economic considerations) based on race. Third is interest convergence: only if the material interests of the majority group align with those of minoritized groups will the majority group cooperate with minorities.

Fourth, races are social constructions which are not fixed, for they are not rooted in biology. Instead, we all share in a common humanity. Roles and expectations are constructs. Fifth is intersectionality. That is, we all have many sources for our “identities” (or, our self-conceptualizations), and these can overlap in many ways to oppress people (e.g., a poor, black poor lesbian).  Sixth, hegemony is “domination by the ruling class and unconscious acceptance of that state of affairs by the subordinate group.”[1]

To help understand CRT better, let’s also look at some of the key philosophical positions of Crits.

Some Key Philosophical Positions

In addition to these key shaping influences, CRT also draws from the broader stream of thought of critical theory (CT). Like we have seen with CRT, critical theorists embraced the view that oppressed groups need to be liberated from their domination by the oppressor group. Moreover, like Marx, key critical theorists, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were materialists and thus they rejected essential natures. So did Nietzsche.

If essences were real, they would have many implications. Why? Essences would define something as what kind of thing it is.[2] Foe example, for Aristotle, the essence of being a human is due its having a human soul, and not some other “principle of life.” However, Adorno rejected the idea that reality is objectively real with essential natures, for that leads us “to establish a single order, a single mode of representing and relating to reality.”[3] For him, on such a view, people would tend to fit into the definitions from the majority’s ideology. Yet, such a view was just a construct that undergirded the dominant group’s hegemony. Thus, peoples’ freedom to define their “true” selves would be undermined, leaving them oppressed.[4]

Likewise, Horkheimer believed that humans are nothing but material beings embedded holistically in nature.[5] Further, Marcuse believed reality is socially conditioned. Our “essence” is not some ontological reality. It is just a term for our human potential to achieve the ideals present in culture, which involves overcoming oppression:

Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves toward a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical structure of the social process of life.[6]

So, what are some implications for their views if there are no essences? First, since there is no essence, such as the soul, to define and ground one’s personal identity (i.e., what makes someone the same person through time and change), it seems our “identity” is something that is definable by us. This can lead to a great sense of unrestricted freedom to not be bound by any of the dominant group’s ideological categories. Instead, people are free to define their “true selves.”

Second, it seems there are no universal qualities, not just for what it means to be authentically human, but also for moral principles and virtues. For example, suppose justice has an essence. Then it seems there would be an identical quality present in each instance of justice, and justice would be a universal quality. Yet, if there are no essences, then each instance would be particular, or nominal: we would call them all instances of justice, yet that is just due to the word we use for them.

Third, if essences are real, they would exist objectively and transcend our own conceptualizations. Yet, on CT and CRT, we are so shaped by our situating factors that all that we know is from a particular, historically situated standpoint. We cannot transcend those limitations and achieve a gaze directly into how reality is, apart from our “situatedness.” That is a strongly nominalist view. Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, who seem strongly influenced by CRT, claim that knowledge is not “outside of human interests, perspectives, and values”; instead, it “reflects the social hierarchies of a given society.”[7]

The Next Step

In the next entry, I will explore the various moral positions of CRT.

[1] Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 175.

[2] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 218.

[3] Andrew Fagan, “Theodor Adorno,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/adorno/, accessed July 11, 2019.

[4] While I was a graduate student in the University of Southern California’s School of Religion, several fellow students were ex-Catholics who were angry that the Church’s hierarchy defined what is “natural,” especially sexually, for them by appealing to natural law and essential natures.

[5] See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (Repr.; New York, NY: Continuum, 1982), 24. In an effort to unify science and philosophy, Horkheimer endorses materialism.

[6] Herbert Marcuse, “Concept of Essence,” in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 67.

[7] Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? in Multicultural Education Series (2nd ed.; ed. James A. Banks; New York: Teachers College Press, 2017), 31. Though DiAngelo might be better classified as an “antiracist,” I include her here because she has embraced much of CRT.

Ethics and Critical Race Theory –CRT and Suspicion 

Suspicion

Before I dive into what CRT is, it would help to understand some important factors that helped give rise to it. Paul Ricouer developed the hermeneutics of suspicion, in which we interpret literary texts with skepticism, to surface their hidden, even repressed, meanings. He was influenced by three seminal thinkers whom he called the “masters of suspicion”: Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. These influences of suspicion have shaped Crits too.

For Marx, more or less, the structures of society serve to protect the interests of the majority group and oppress those of minority groups. The explanation of historical events is due to differences between classes (historical materialism), not individual conscious motives, choices. Nietzsche contributed the view that while we used to think morals were universal truths, they really are just expressions of power, the will to dominate others. Freud added that we used to think that our behavior was due basically to our conscious thoughts and choices. Instead, the unconscious is really why we behave as we do (e.g., due to fathers and sexuality).

CRT employs this overall attitude of suspicion to at least three main areas in its critique of westernized societies. First is a suspicion of appeals to universal rights, freedom, equality, and dignity of all. So often, these are just words and empty promises. And, by focusing primarily on abstract, universal principles, we can overlook the suffering of particular people.

Second is a suspicion of liberalism, i.e., our form of government that focuses on the good of the individual as the subject of universal rights. Yet, so often, we focus on having fair procedures. But, these can end up being undermined in practice. Third is a suspicion of meritocracy. For Crits, it is a myth that we all can improve our lots by hard work and achievement.

What then is CRT? Let me quote at length the UCLA School of Public Affairs:

“CRT recognizes that racism is engrained in the fabric and system of the American society. The individual racist need not exist to note that institutional racism is pervasive in the dominant culture. This is the analytical lens that CRT uses in examining existing power structures. CRT identifies that these power structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy, which perpetuates the marginalization of people of color. CRT also rejects the traditions of liberalism and meritocracy. Legal discourse says that the law is neutral and colorblind, however, CRT challenges … liberalism and meritocracy as a vehicle for self-interest, power, and privilege. CRT also recognizes that liberalism and meritocracy are often stories heard from those with wealth, power, and privilege. These stories paint a false picture of meritocracy; everyone who works hard can attain wealth, power, and privilege while ignoring the systemic inequalities that institutional racism provides.”[1]

We can notice at least two of these forms of suspicion (liberalism and meritocracy) mentioned explicitly herein. The other one, with its suspicion of appeals to moral rights, equality, and dignity, seems to be embedded in claims such as that the power structures, which are dominated by the white majority, marginalize and oppress people of color.

CRT’s Development

Now, the development of CRT has had several significant, shaping influences. First, critical legal studies has, in part, helped foster the belief that law is mainly about power and not morals.[2] But, it did not originate that belief. Long before, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes divorced law from morality. As Albert Alschuler notes, for Holmes, “[a] law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the community even if it will take us to hell.”[3]

A second influence has come through the work of Michel Foucault. He helped develop the view that “power is transmitted, normalized, and internalized through social institutions,” which socializes people “into compliance with norms that serve controlling group interests.”[4] Third, radical feminism provided insights into how power relates to the construction of social roles, as well as the largely unnoticed patterns and habits that contribute to forms of domination (e.g., from patriarchy).

A fourth influence has come through the work of Jacques Derrida and his deconstructionist thought. Derrida denied that there are any essential natures which would define something as the kind of thing it is, or as what some author or speaker really meant. Instead, everything is interpretation. So-called universal truths (including moral ones) are power moves.

In the next blog, I will try to give examples of some key Crits. Then, I will explain several of CRT’s key tenets. Last, I will surface several of CRT’s key ethical views.

[1] “What is critical race theory?” UCLA School of Public Affairs: Critical Race Studies, https://spacrs.wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/, accessed June 16, 2022 (emphasis in original).

[2] For a discussion of CRT in relation to CLS, see Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2017).

[3] Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 59.

[4] Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? 2nd ed., in Multicultural Education Series, ed. James A. Banks (New York: Teachers College Press, 2017), 75-76.

Ethics and Critical Race Theory – An Introduction

Critical race theory (CRT) is everywhere, it seems. It is taught, whether explicitly or implicitly, in middle and high schools, as well as universities, whether secular or Christian. It is in the news constantly. There are many buzz words associated with it, such as “systemic racism,” being “woke,” and more. Its very mention has a polarizing effect on people, with many (such as “progressives,” whether secular or Christian) endorsing policies consistent with it, while others assume it is of the devil. Several conservative politicians and commentators denounce CRT, condemning it as Marxist, un-American, and even atheistic. Some conservative Christians also have joined in, warning against CRT from various biblical standpoints.

I get the impression that several Christians seem to think that if they can identify CRT as Marxist, they can dismiss it from any consideration. But, I think that move could be shortsighted for at least a few reasons. First, I have seen a similar response to the “emergents.” I have written two books on the emergents, Truth and the New Kind of Christian (2005), and Authentically Emergent (2018). In both books, I note that they have several helpful insights for evangelicals. However, in 2010, Brian McLaren published his book, A New Kind of Christianity, and it became clearer that he was advocating changes to core Christian beliefs. It was after that that I saw how some other Christians were quick to not listen, apparently even to the good things he or others had to say. After all, they were heretics, so let’s move on. But in that attitude, they could miss the good things the emergents had to say. So, if “Crits” are indeed onto some key observations, it would be shortsighted to dismiss the whole view out of hand.

Second, in my experience, if a view has some “staying power” and influence, it usually is making some key observations. It is tapping into some aspect of reality to which people can relate. Just as the emergents did that to certain respects, I think we need to carefully examine CRT to see to what extent that may be the case, too. For instance, George Yancey, a Christian sociologist at Baylor University, notes that today “few Americans [and very few biblically conservative believers] want to openly participate in a racist social system.”[1] Nevertheless, Crits continue to offer evidence that racism still is at work in society. Instead of focusing mainly on individual racists, they study institutions. Yancey, who himself is not an advocate of CRT, argues that racism has become more subtle, working through systemic, institutionalized ways that obscure “its effects on the opportunities and freedoms of people of color.”[2] If so, then as a descriptive tool of analysis, CRT can help us notice if such practices are indeed at work, which we then could change. That is a contribution of CRT.

Third, having a better understanding of CRT would help Christians to participate more fruitfully in the many conversations taking place about racial matters. This is especially so for young adults, whether Christian or not. People who are part of Gen Z are very attuned to concerns with racism, such as with ways police treat minorities.[3] They have been grown up during police shootings of many unarmed black people, hatred toward Asians during the COVID pandemic, and suspicion of Muslims as terrorists after 9/11. To the eyes of Gen Z people, American society has promised justice, rights, equality, opportunity, and more. Yet, they have seen justice violated many times.[4] So, understanding CRT would help Christians to understand some important mindsets of Gen Z.

Crucially, Crits are making rhetorically powerful ethical claims that resonate deeply because of the history of racism in the U. S. They are arguing that racism is more pervasive than we realize, being embedded in systems and institutions, despite civil rights legislations’ effects. This is a descriptive claim about what is in fact the case. They also argue that people of color should be treated with equality, dignity, respect, and justice, yet racism is preventing them from being treated appropriately. This latter claim is a normative, ethical one, of what ought to be the case.

CRT has several other presuppositions including, for example, that people of color are being oppressed by whites, and they should be liberated from this oppression. It also presupposes certain views of what is real, including humans, namely materialism. It also maintains that we can know what is true only from our particular standpoints. Now, I will start from what CRT presupposes, that racism is morally wrong. But, a key question is this: can CRT make good on its key moral claims given its various presuppositions? That will be the focus of this series.  

[1] George Yancey, Beyond Racial Gridlock: Embracing Mutual Responsibility (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 67 (bracketed insert mine).

[2] Ibid., 67-68.

[3] They also are deeply concerned about many social justice issues, such as environmental justice, sexism, economic disparities, issues involving gender, poverty, and capitalism, and how these intersect with race.

[4] Moreover, unlike previous generations, Gen Z is growing up in an age marked by many factors, including of terrorism, human trafficking, perpetual wars, nuclear threats, distrust of politicians, and more. If the “system” is not working, it can become easy to think that people should change the system.

Two August 2021 Updates

As is the case for all of us, COVID has impacted me as well. Part of it included a much heavier teaching load in the fall of ’20 and spring of ’21. Often I was scrambling just to keep up with online classes and students’ many posts!

Also, in many writing projects, I feel I have been “on hold,” waiting for publishers to reply to me or to release some work that I did some time ago. I have three book projects in the works, one on nominalism, another on critical race theory (an ethical, philosophical assessment), and how the church has been deeply affected by naturalism (and what to do about it).

I want to catch you up on some developments. Two essays have been published in the first half of 2021.

In January, my essay on nominalism and human dignity appeared:

“The Nominalist Foundations of Constructivist Dignity.” In The Inherence of Human Dignity: Foundations of Human Dignity, Vol. 1, ed. by Barry Bussey and Angus Menuge (Anthem Press, 2021).

These two edited volumes explore philosophical, legal, and other factors involved in human dignity discussions today (including the “new dignity”), and not just in the U.S.

Another essay was published this spring, and this one explores the implications of William Lane Craig’s anti-Platonism (or, nominalism) for the penal substitutionary theory of Christ’s atonement:

“Craig’s Anti-Platonism, Lowe’s Universals, and Christ’s Penal Substitutionary Atonement.” TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 5(2), 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.55993

Two more essays, as well as one book proposal, are out for review, so I hope to have some more updates sometime soon.

Book Review of Greg Koukl’s “Tactics,” 10th Anniversary ed.

Greg Koukl, Tactics: A Game Plan for Discussing Your Christian Convictions, 10th anniversary edition (Zondervan, 2019).

Greg Koukl's book, "Tactics"

Greg Koukl is one of my colleagues in Biola’s MA Christian Apologetics program, and his updated version of Tactics is a must-read for all Christians who desire to be effective ambassadors for Christ. These tactics help ambassadors “effectively maneuver in a relaxed and confident way in [their] conversations with others about Christ, even when they disagree strongly with you” (17). But, his goal is not to enable Christians to “win” every conversation with those who do not yet know Christ. Instead, it is to be effective ambassadors while being a “gardener,” one who plants seeds for the gospel.

Koukl introduces the book with a general overview of the importance and role of tactics. Each chapter is accessibly and conversationally written, filled with key points and illustrations drawn from his extensive experience, followed up by a summary of what we learned. Part one focuses on the “game plan,” in which he unpacks and demonstrates the uses of his “Columbo” tactic. Part two shifts to provide tactics that help ambassadors for Christ find flaws in claims made by others.

The book is easy to read and glean many helpful tips, even from a quick read. However, careful practice of his many tips will help reap the book’s deeper benefits. These fruits come from cultivating his tactics as habits. Anticipating questions how readers can develop these habits, Koukl provides several practical suggestions in the last chapter.

In part one, he starts by stressing the need ambassadors have for knowledge, character, and wisdom (an artful method), and Koukl’s tactics focus on the third of these elements. Tactics are not “manipulative tricks or slick ruses”; instead, they are “techniques of maneuvering in what otherwise might be difficult conversations” (34). Nor are they techniques to be used to steamroll people into becoming Christians. Koukl advises that these tactics require good listening and being charitable and gracious, as well as providing thoughtful responses.

Before diving into the “Columbo” tactic, Koukl pauses to address helpfully some reservations various Christians have to engaging in argumentation. For one, he counters a common misconception, that we can argue people into the kingdom (44). Yet, he wisely realizes that simply employing methods will not result in kingdom fruit: “without God’s work, nothing else works” (45). For another, he takes off the pressure to have to convert someone to Christ in every conversation. Instead, his more modest goal in any encounter is to “put a stone in someone’s shoe,” to get that person to think more about Christ and the plausibility of the gospel’s claims.

Chapters three through nine address uses of the Columbo tactic, which Koukl names after Lt. Columbo, the homicide detective who would solve cases by asking a litany of questions. The key to using this tactic is to “go on the offensive” inoffensively “with carefully selected questions that advance the conversation” (57). There are several advantages to using questions, and Koukl suggests using them to gather information, reverse the burden of proof, and make a point (60).

The key way to gather information is to inquire of the challenger, “what do you mean by that” claim? By drawing upon his many years of experience, Koukl helpfully navigates readers through challenges to this approach.

The second is a response to claims made as a challenge to Christianity. Koukl’s recommended move here is to reverse the burden of proof by asking the person, “How did you come to that conclusion?” Moreover, he helps readers discern differences between peoples’ replies of simply giving an opinion versus an argument with reasons.

Before exploring the third step in the Columbo tactic, Koukl explains how to respond to two specific situations in which a Christian ambassador is on the defensive and the challenger is in the driver’s seat. Here, Koukl unpacks the “professor’s ploy” and “getting out of the hot seat,” as well as a third tactic he calls “narrating the debate.”

Columbo’s third step uses questions to make a point, which help the ambassador go more on the offensive, yet inoffensively. This can be done in various ways, including to help explain one’s point, set up discussion to more easily make a point, indirectly expose a flaw in another’s views, and soften the challenge to another’s views. I can resonate readily with the last two suggestions, which tend to come fairly naturally for me. Then, in wrapping up part one, Koukl addresses how to respond wisely and effectively to challenges that employ the Columbo tactic.

Part two dives into other tactics that help ambassadors find flaws in claims and reasons given by challengers to Christianity. One of the key benefits in all these chapters is how Koukl gives current, real-world illustrations and applications for each tactic. He devotes three chapters to kinds of self-refuting claims. Then, he explores “taking the roof off,” which involves taking a view to its logical conclusion, to see its flaws.

Koukl then explores many other tactics, such as the steamroller, Rhodes Scholar, just the facts ma’am, inside-out, and several mini-tactics. Once again, the power of these chapters is found in Koukl’s clear explanations and wisdom born of commitment to truth and real-life experience.

Now, I can imagine some Christians who have been influenced by the postmodern turn might consider Koukl’s book to be just another instance of “modern” apologetics and thereby dismiss it. But that would be shortsighted, I think. One of the key themes throughout this book is that believers need to engage in loving dialogues with others, and that by employing good questions and good listening (and the tactics of part two), we can have fruitful discussions about many important issues with those who are unconvinced about Christianity, and even amongst ourselves as believers. From my own experience, I have tried to be a good listener and ask good questions, and that has led to several fruitful discussions with others shaped by the postmodern turn.

Most apologetics books address specific kinds of subjects, such as arguments for God’s existence, the reliability of Scripture, morality, science, and more, providing reasons why Christianity is true. Yet, this book does something comparatively unique; it provides tools to help the ambassador for Christ know how to use this knowledge well, so as to be effective and loving. As such, this is an invaluable resource for apologists, filling in the need for a “plan to artfully manage the details of [their] dialogues with others” (33). I highly recommend the book, and its tactics deserve close study and practice.

Making Sense of Morality: Objections from Euthyphro and Evil

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

In the previous post, I argued that there is another explanation for the ground of core morals, such as justice and love are good, and murder and rape are wrong: they are grounded in God. However, there are a couple serious objections that I will address here, and then I will summarize several of my findings.

Euthyphro Dilemma

“Euthyphro” poses a dilemma: are morals good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good? If the former, it seems God’s will alone is the ground of morals. But, it seems God could will whatever God wanted, and it would be moral. If so, God could will things we clearly know are wrong, even evil, such as justice being bad, and rape being permissible. Earlier, I suggested this issue seems to face Allah, due to the supremacy of Allah’s sovereignty.

If the latter, it seems God’s commands are redundant, for we already should know morals are valid. Also, they seem to be valid independently of God; if so, God is not needed to ground morals. Moreover, God must consult these morals before commanding them.

 Regarding the former, the Scriptures of Judaism and Christianity portray God as being morally perfect and good. That is, God is bound by God’s character, so God would not will something that is contrary to that character. Moreover, that God is good fits with what we may know by reason and reflection (i.e., what many have called natural law), including our core morals and others too (e.g., we should not torture babies for fun).

On the latter, we may need to have some understanding of goodness before we can know God is good. But, it does not follow from that that morals are independent of God. Further, just because we can know some moral truths without God’s commands (e.g., by reason), still we possess a remarkable ability to suppress or rationalize away what we know morally. In that case, God’s commanding something we can know via reason would not be redundant, but a reinforcement and clarification of that knowledge. 

Back to Evil

So far, I’ve suggested that the best explanation of our core morals is that they are grounded in God’s moral character. But, is there more we can infer by reason?

Suppose we consider evil. Many think evil provides one of the strongest arguments against God’s existence. Yet, what kind of thing is evil? Earlier, I suggested that evil is a privation (or perversion) of goodness. Indeed, it seems hard to define evil is some way other than the way things should not be.

If that is the case, evil presupposes goodness, like Augustine suggested. What then is the best explanation for this standard of goodness? Above, I suggested it is God’s own character. Yet, we can infer more, I think. To be truly good, God must be love. This suggests God is personal. Furthermore, to be truly good, God must be truly just.

Together, these two findings suggest that God would deal with evil, yet in love and care for humans. This in turn raises questions for consideration that are beyond the scope of this book: which God is this? And, has God done this? If so, how? What are implications for us?

Final Thoughts

We have completed our survey of the major moral views in the west. I’ve argued that the best explanation for our core morals is that they are universals that are grounded in God’s morally good character. I’ve argued for this while also arguing for several more key points; e.g.:

  • Nominalism is false, and Platonic-like universals exist;
  • There are essences, including of core morals, human beings, and mental states (they have intentionality); and
  • We can know reality directly, even though our situatedness does affect us in significant ways. So, historicism is mistaken.

Notice too that from our findings, the fact-value split, the deeply held belief that science uniquely gives us knowledge of the facts, whereas ethics and religion give us just opinions and preferences, is false. Science, if grounded in naturalism and nominalism, cannot give us knowledge at all. On the other hand, we do have ethical knowledge of at least our four core morals. Maybe there are more we can know. We also have justified reasons to believe it is true that God is ground of morals – another item of knowledge.

For Further Reading

William Alston, “What Euthyphro Should Have Said,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, gen. ed. William Lane Craig

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, chs. 12-13