This essay came out in Philosophia Christi 24:2 (2022). Here’s an abstract:
William Lane Craig has defended nominalist forms of “anti-Platonism” as normative for orthodox Christians. He believes Platonic abstract objects (AOs) undermine God’s uniqueness as the only being that exists a se. Yet, I will argue that his view actually depends upon the reality of AOs. Furthermore, I will draw upon insights from phenomenology. By paying close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, I will argue that, contrary to Craig, we can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.
I will develop my argument first by sketching Craig’s nominalist views and his important use of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks. In so doing, I will draw extensively upon his essay, “Propositional Truth – Who Needs It?” to sketch the importance of his neutralist theory of reference and his deflationary view of truth, and how those relate to truth as correspondence. Second, I will draw upon Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method and apply it to examples of Craig’s concrete particulars. I will focus especially on Craig’s linguistic examples. My findings will serve as evidence against his nominalist anti-Platonism, and in favor of ante rem universals.