Introduction
Earlier, I described CRT’s approach to knowledge as one in which we are situated historically and contingently, such that no one can achieve a neutral, unbiased standpoint to gaze directly into reality and know it as such. Instead, to even have an experience requires interpretation. We may call this a kind of standpoint epistemology: we always gain knowledge from our particular, limited standpoints, which have been shaped by the aforementioned kinds of factors. Moreover, drawing from people like Nietzsche and Foucault, Crits hold that claims to have knowledge of objective truth really reflect our provisional interpretive grids and our wills to power.
Now, as I have noted earlier, there are some key strengths to their view. Here are two. First, Crits call our attention to actual, concrete human lives, and not abstractions, to see how actions and policies may harm them. The colorblind model can contribute to this effect, for it influences people to not notice the specific ways blacks and other minorities experience and suffer from racism by treating all people in a generalized way. Second, CRT helps researchers by calling attention to systems and institutions, to see ifthere are cases of racism therein.
But there also are some key problems, ones which threaten to undermine CRT itself and its contributions.
Problems with CRT’s Standpoint Epistemology
Let me start with a conceptual problem. If everything is interpretation, then it is not possible to even have an experience of the world without that involving interpretation. Now, I do think it is very important that we interpret our experiences. Yet, CRT is not saying just that. It espouses the view that all our experiences themselves are interpretation- (or theory-) laden. It is as though our interpretive lenses are glued to our faces, and so we cannot remove them.
Suppose this is the case, and we experience a situation in which it seems to us that a white police officer racially profiled a black driver. Yet, if everything is interpretation, we cannot access what actually is the case. We are so constrained by our situatedness that apparently all we can access is our interpretation thereof. But, then we face a further problem: we cannot even access that interpretation as it is, for it too is interpreted. Evidently, then, a second interpretation is involved. However, the same requirement repeats again and again, without any way in principle to stop a regress of interpretations. Knowledge, much less interpretations, cannot even get started, it seems.
If so, then it seems that this result undermines all of CRT’s claims whatsoever, for they too can be nothing other than its particular interpretations. So, it seems Crits could not even begin to form the core concepts of CRT, such as the realities of white supremacy, systemic racism, oppression of racial minorities, inequality, injustice, and more. Nor could we know that these concepts match up with reality. If so, why should others listen to Crits?
We also should consider how Crits tend to argue strenuously for their positions, and they supply good, descriptive support for many points. They want others (non-Crits) to see that their view is correct and should be adopted. However, if CRT cannot even begin to give us knowledge of how things really are in society, why should others give allegiance to its interpretations? Moreover, since CRT must be just a particular interpretation of justice, then it seems that national policy, which would apply to all people therein, should not be set on the basis of CRT.
Still more can be written against the presupposition that interpretation goes “all the way down.” It does not seem to be true descriptively. While it is true that we are shaped by a number of factors, which do contribute to our “interpretive grid,” it still seems possible (even actual) that we can learn to pay attention to other things that we may not have noticed before. J. P. Moreland explains that due to “attentive influence,” we can become habituated in terms of what we pay attention to, which also can lead to habituated interpretations. Yet, over time, we can fall into ruts and not pay attention to other phenomena. Still, we can develop new habits and begin to notice other things, even though it may be difficult.[1]
In my own case, I come from a Caucasian, middle-class family, and I did not experience racial profiling by police. Now, my growing up in that kind of home obviously is very different than one in which someone is a racial minority and has experienced much racial profiling. While I have not had the same experiences of such a person, it still seems I can seek to develop habits that would enable me to become more attentive to such incidents and how they happen. Part of that can occur by my getting to know and listening to stories of people of color who have experienced profiling, which I have tried to do even in my classes.
Another issue is that according to CRT, all its views must be contingent; they are not necessary, a priori truths, for there are no essences. So, for example, when we come to Crits’ claims of widespread, systemic racism, we should not interpret this as an in-principle truth claim. Rather, to be consistent, it must be an a posteriori claim, one that would be known empirically and be so due to various contingencies.
Nevertheless, that is not how Crits always argue. For instance, consider Ibram Kendi’s claim that “to oppose reparations is to be racist. To support reparations is to be anti-racist.”[2] His wording suggests he intends it as a blanket, universal truth claim. Rhetorically, it is powerful and, if true, no one could oppose reparations and yet not be a racist. However, that is not true, for George Yancey, who himself is black, is a counterexample. Yancey provides reasons against reparations that are not racist and has worked toward racial reconciliation.[3] So even this claim is not true in principle. It, along with other CRT claims, has to be investigated and found to be true in fact. Moreover, like I argued above, this and other such claims can be only Crits’ interpretations, yet without being able to know if they are in line with reality.
Conclusion
This is but a brief assessment of issues related to CRT and standpoint epistemology. But in the next post, I will try to explore more issues from CRT for ethics.
[1] J. P. Moreland, “Two Areas of Reflection and Dialogue with John Franke,” Philosophia Christi 8:2: 307–12.
[2] Ibram X. Kendi, “There Is No Middle Ground on Reparations,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ibram-x-kendi-opposing-reparations-racist/592060/, June 19, 2019, accessed February 2, 2022. Note: while Kendi uses “antiracist” as a self-description, nonetheless his views do seem to draw deeply from CRT.
[3] George Yancey, Beyond Racial Gridlock: Embracing Mutual Responsibility (Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2006), 105–106.