Tag: morality

Assessing Critical Race Theory on Human Nature and Morals

Introduction

Previously, I mentioned several key morals that Crits rightly recognize as good and right, such as justice is good, humans should be treated with dignity and equality, and racism is wrong. These are important strengths of CRT.

The Nature of Humans and Morals

Yet, CRT also presupposes that there are no essences. Instead, we are material beings in a material world. So, despite Crits’ evident presupposition that humans should be treated as intrinsically valuable, there is nothing that exists intrinsically, or essentially, to being human that defines the kind of thing we are, or how we should live. That is, there is no grounding for their presupposition. Also, on CRT, moral principles and qualities do not have an essence that defines them. Instead, morals end up being our constructs. So, for instance, justice does not have an essence to it that we need to discover and with which we align ourselves. Rather, justice is nothing but a matter of our interpretation.

Now, if justice (as well as other morals) had an essence, then there could be an identical quality that literally is in common to all instances of just people and actions. But, since there is no such essence on CRT, there is no such thing as justice per se, one quality for which we all should strive to achieve and embody. There are no morals that are true for all people in all times and places and exist apart from our constructs. Instead, morals are particulars, which shows CRT’s dependence on nominalism.

  • Let’s contrast this stance with a biblical one about humans, morals, and their natures. Biblically, humans are made in God’s image, which defines us as the kind of thing we are in contrast to any other created thing (cf. Gen 1:21 & 26). So, to be an image bearer is to be human; it is our essential nature. Moreover, the particular essence of an individual human is that human’s soul.[1] Moreover, Scripture presupposes that all humans bear God’s image, such that it is one set of qualities that can be in many instances. That is, it is a universal.
  • Since we are made in God’s image, there are moral qualities and principles that are normative for us. Scripture informs us that we are to become like Christ (e.g., Rom 8:29; Eph 5:1-2; Gal 5:22-23), which includes being like Him morally. These qualities are those of Jesus which also are appropriate for us as image bearers. And, each such moral quality is a one-in-many, i.e., a universal. Moreover, there is an essence to them that defines them as what they are; e.g., justice is not identical to love, even though they are to be partners in action. Finally, they are objectively real; they are valid and exist, whether or not any of us believes them to be so. So, they are not our products.

Some Initial Implications

First, if there are no essences to these key morals, then justice, equality, dignity, and even oppression are up to people to define as they see best. Of course, how one group defines them may vary from another, for these are just a group’s particular constructs. But, this will perpetuate inevitably the very thing Crits decry – the hegemony of the powerful. Indeed, it seems on CRT that morals can only be power moves.

Second, since humans and the rest of reality is just made of matter, it seems CRT faces the well-known problems that afflict other views that accept that same kind of ontology. For instance, physicalist views face the problem that in a physical world, it seems humans’ character and actions can be exhausted descriptively. Yet, morality is about normativity – how we ought to live and treat others. In other words, such views, including CRT, face the problem of how we can derive the moral ought from what is the case physically.

Now, some, such as Christine Korsgaard, have tried to address this problem by claiming we can impose our moral concepts onto matter.[2] Drawing upon Kant and John Rawls, she thinks we can will that our moral maxims (plans of action) be universalized for all people. Nonetheless, the end result is that we construct these morals, which still are particulars ontologically (though we will that they apply to all). They do not have essential natures, and so they are subject to our conceptualizations, with the same problem I just considered above.

The Next Steps

There are many more implications of CRT’s ontology for humans and morals, and I will continue this discussion in the next blog. I will look at what I think is a crucial issue: the lack of our intrinsic value and how that leads to many (futile) attempts today to secure our moral worth.

[1] Here, I will not investigate some Christians’ claims that we are basically physical beings without a soul. I have done so elsewhere, such as in my chapter, “Physicalism and Sanctification,” in Christian Physicalism, eds. Joshua Farris and Keith Loftin (Lexington Books, 2018). That essay addresses the prospects of becoming like Christ on a physicalist anthropology.

[2] See her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also my discussion of her views in my In Search of Moral Knowledge (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2014).

Making Sense of Morality: Objections from Euthyphro and Evil

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

In the previous post, I argued that there is another explanation for the ground of core morals, such as justice and love are good, and murder and rape are wrong: they are grounded in God. However, there are a couple serious objections that I will address here, and then I will summarize several of my findings.

Euthyphro Dilemma

“Euthyphro” poses a dilemma: are morals good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good? If the former, it seems God’s will alone is the ground of morals. But, it seems God could will whatever God wanted, and it would be moral. If so, God could will things we clearly know are wrong, even evil, such as justice being bad, and rape being permissible. Earlier, I suggested this issue seems to face Allah, due to the supremacy of Allah’s sovereignty.

If the latter, it seems God’s commands are redundant, for we already should know morals are valid. Also, they seem to be valid independently of God; if so, God is not needed to ground morals. Moreover, God must consult these morals before commanding them.

 Regarding the former, the Scriptures of Judaism and Christianity portray God as being morally perfect and good. That is, God is bound by God’s character, so God would not will something that is contrary to that character. Moreover, that God is good fits with what we may know by reason and reflection (i.e., what many have called natural law), including our core morals and others too (e.g., we should not torture babies for fun).

On the latter, we may need to have some understanding of goodness before we can know God is good. But, it does not follow from that that morals are independent of God. Further, just because we can know some moral truths without God’s commands (e.g., by reason), still we possess a remarkable ability to suppress or rationalize away what we know morally. In that case, God’s commanding something we can know via reason would not be redundant, but a reinforcement and clarification of that knowledge. 

Back to Evil

So far, I’ve suggested that the best explanation of our core morals is that they are grounded in God’s moral character. But, is there more we can infer by reason?

Suppose we consider evil. Many think evil provides one of the strongest arguments against God’s existence. Yet, what kind of thing is evil? Earlier, I suggested that evil is a privation (or perversion) of goodness. Indeed, it seems hard to define evil is some way other than the way things should not be.

If that is the case, evil presupposes goodness, like Augustine suggested. What then is the best explanation for this standard of goodness? Above, I suggested it is God’s own character. Yet, we can infer more, I think. To be truly good, God must be love. This suggests God is personal. Furthermore, to be truly good, God must be truly just.

Together, these two findings suggest that God would deal with evil, yet in love and care for humans. This in turn raises questions for consideration that are beyond the scope of this book: which God is this? And, has God done this? If so, how? What are implications for us?

Final Thoughts

We have completed our survey of the major moral views in the west. I’ve argued that the best explanation for our core morals is that they are universals that are grounded in God’s morally good character. I’ve argued for this while also arguing for several more key points; e.g.:

  • Nominalism is false, and Platonic-like universals exist;
  • There are essences, including of core morals, human beings, and mental states (they have intentionality); and
  • We can know reality directly, even though our situatedness does affect us in significant ways. So, historicism is mistaken.

Notice too that from our findings, the fact-value split, the deeply held belief that science uniquely gives us knowledge of the facts, whereas ethics and religion give us just opinions and preferences, is false. Science, if grounded in naturalism and nominalism, cannot give us knowledge at all. On the other hand, we do have ethical knowledge of at least our four core morals. Maybe there are more we can know. We also have justified reasons to believe it is true that God is ground of morals – another item of knowledge.

For Further Reading

William Alston, “What Euthyphro Should Have Said,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, gen. ed. William Lane Craig

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, chs. 12-13

Making Sense of Morality: Where Do We Go from Here?

Various ethics terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Summary of the Survey

We have surveyed major ethical options for what our core morals are, including:

  • Are they how we happen to talk?
  • Are they physical things? Perhaps evolutionary products?
  • Are they ways of behaving or moving our bodies?
  • Are they results of a utilitarian calculus?
  • Are they emotive utterances?
  • Are they particulars? (nominalism)

But, at least since Hobbes, I’ve argued that none of the views can preserve our core morals of murder and rape being wrong, and love and justice being good.

What Are These Core Morals?

For one, they seem to be objectively real. They seem to exist independently of us as moral principles and values. They also simply seem to be intrinsically valid, and not due to anything else (like, the consequences). That is, they seem to have an essential moral nature. Moreover, they cannot be just physical things or particulars, as we’ve seen. Instead, they seem to be a “one-in-many” – each one is one principle (or value), yet it can have many instances/examples. In sum, they seem to be Platonic-like universals.

That raises many questions, however. Earlier, I remarked that Christine Korsgaard rightly observed that it’s hard to see how such things could have anything to do with us. While she thinks people are physical, it still applies if we are a body-soul unity. Why should these abstract objects have anything to do with us? On Plato’s view, they exist in a heavenly realm of values as brute features of reality.

What makes justice and love character qualities that should be present in us? Why is it inappropriate morally for us to murder or rape? These are normative qualities, not merely descriptive. As we’ve seen, it is hard to see how we can get the moral ought from what is descriptively the case. Yet, that problem could be overcome if humans have an essential nature that makes these moral values appropriate for them, and these acts inappropriate.

Earlier, I argued that the soul as our essential nature provides a sound explanation for how we can be the identical person through change. Body-soul dualists affirm that the soul is our essential nature, and it sets the boundary conditions for what is appropriate for us. For instance, it is inappropriate for us to grow a cat’s tail due to our nature, and it is inappropriate for us to murder due to our nature.

We also saw another reason for the soul’s existence. We do in fact think and form beliefs, yet these have intentionality, which I argued is best understood as something immaterial and having an essence. Now, it is hard to conceive how a physical brain could interact with something immaterial, but that problem does not seem to exist for an immaterial soul/mind.

Moreover, why should we feel guilt and shame when we break these core morals? That doesn’t make sense if these morals are just abstract objects that are immaterial and not located in space and time. Instead, we seem to have such responses in the presence of persons we have wronged morally. Also, retributive justice doesn’t make sense if we repay an abstract principle or value. But it would make sense if a person should be repaid.

There is another explanation we have seen for the grounding of these core morals: they are grounded in God. That helps solve the question of why we feel shame when we break one of these morals. But, that also raises questions, such as: are they good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good (i.e., the Euthyphro dilemma)? Also, which God would this be?

I will start to tackle these in the next essay. But, first, there is another option for properties besides universals (realism) and nominalism. It is divine conceptualism; properties just are God’s concepts. Justice in us is God’s concept. Yet, concepts have intentionality, but virtues do not. When we think about people being just, we don’t mean they have a concept of justice (though they could), but that they have that virtue present in them. So, offhand, divine conceptualism seems to trade on a confusion.

For Further Reading

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 12