Introduction

In previous posts, I have assessed CRT from a couple main standpoints. First, CRT’s rejection of essences leaves core moral principles, like justice and equality, as nothing but our constructs. We get to define them as we see fit. So, these core morals also end up being just the results of hegemonic power, the very thing Crits decry. Second, CRT bases the value of humans on their self-conceptualizations (their “true selves”), but this basis cannot preserve our dignity and equality. It substitutes our constructs for intrinsic value. And, if people construct their value, others can deconstruct it and take it away.

While these problems are serious, they are not the only ones due to CRT’s antiessentialism. Here I will look at two more. In the next blog, I will raise a third issue stemming from what kind of thing morals (& humans) are according to CRT. These problems undermine even CRT’s good ethical claims.

The Problem for Autonomy

A major point of appeal of CRT is that humans should be free to define their “true selves” by their own self-conceptualizations. To do this, they must throw off the categories of the majority’s ideology.

Now, surely we have abilities to form our identities (i.e., our self-concepts), and we do this all the time. People may understand themselves (their “sense of identity”) primarily in terms of various self-chosen concepts and categories, whether those be job-, race-, gender-, class-, religion-, or other-related. Christians do this, too, in that they are to see themselves first and foremost as disciples of Jesus, versus under some other aspect that could take priority (e.g., one’s achievements, wealth, etc.)

But, CRT posits that we are nothing but material beings, without an essential nature, which would be the soul. As such, we would seem to be completely subject to the laws of physical state-state causation. In short, it seems we would be exhaustively determined in our choices and actions, such that we would not have any freedom of the will, which is presupposed by, and necessary for, our being autonomous.

However, perhaps a compatibilist view about freedom of the will could be used to help preserve our freedom, all the while we are beings that are subjects of state-state causation. How? Compatibilism asserts that freedom is consistent with being determined. In terms of ability, compatibilism claims that at any given time, a person can do only one thing, which depends upon the state that person happens to be in. In terms of control, of a previous chain of states produces one’s choices and actions. Last, in terms of reason, does not originate anything, like new thoughts or inquiries; it is passive.

In short, compatibilism is consistent with a view of a materialist view of humans. They are just bundles of properties that pass on what they receive from prior states. Thus, at the very least, it is very hard to see how there is any room for a self to originate any kinds of thought or desires, much less freely define one’s true self. If these things are so, then it seems CRT cannot adequately ground its own appeals to our autonomy, which is one of its major “selling points.”

The Problem for Justice

The second issue I will explore in this blog is an implication for justice. Not only is justice up to us, I also think it is impossible to achieve on CRT. Here I will explore one aspect of this issue.

Why would justice be impossible to achieve on CRT? For justice to be done for someone, it presupposes that that person can be identified by us and, even more importantly, is the very one who was treated unjustly before. Then, legally, society can bring remedies to correct that injustice.

But, it seems impossible for there to be any continuity of a given self through time and change on CRT. This issue involves what is called personal identity: what is it that makes a given person the same one through time and change? This is different from CRT’s frequent appeal to one’s sense of identity, which is our way of defining and conceiving of ourselves. Since CRT rejects essences, they cannot be the basis for one’s personal identity. Instead, CRT seems left with appealing to possible solutions that can fit with materialism. What might those include?

I will focus on two main possibilities. The first is that the sameness of person is grounded in sameness of memories. If a person P2 has the memories of someone (P1) who was treated unjustly in the past, then P2 is the same person as P1.

Now, since the law of identity requires that for two things to be identical (there is really only one thing, not two), all their properties must be in common. Now, is this true in the case of P1 and P2? Even if P2 has the same memories of that injustice as P1, P2 & P1 have different temporal properties. Suppose, for example, that P2 is now 45 years old, whereas P1 was treated unjustly (say, for being discriminated against by the practice of redlining in real estate) at age 30. Also, P2 has earned a master degree, whereas P1 had only a bachelor’s degree. Moreover, P2 has been divorced and also does not have his appendix, while P1 was married and had his appendix.

Clearly, then, there are things true of P2 that are not true of P1. Following the law of identity, they are not the same person. Moreover, on a materialist view, it seems that persons are just bundles of material properties, including their memories. There is no underlying essence that would make them the same person, despite differences of temporal or other kinds of properties and parts.

The second option for personal identity on a materialist view is sameness of story. If the story of P2 is identical to the story of P1, then they are the same person. But this too cannot be the case; surely P2 has more details in his story than that of P1, even if the rest of P2’s story matches completely that of P1’s. Again, the law of identity forces us to conclude that they are not the same person.

Is it possible then for a person who was treated unjustly in the past to have that injustice remedied? It seems it would not on CRT, for it lacks a basis for the sameness of persons through time and change. Literally, there is no continuity of persons on CRT’s materialism, and so there is no possibility for justice to be meted out to people.

Of course, many will object to this, perhaps by appealing to our common sense understanding that surely P1 & P2 are the same person. Again, they might do this by appealing to memories, or perhaps to a set of sufficient commonalities of body parts to justify the claim that they are the same person. But all this does is establish for others how we may know that P1 & P2 are the same person. Our knowledge does not make P1 & P2 the same person; rather, that knowledge depends upon their being the same person. And that issue is the one that materialists seem unable to provide.

In the next blog, I will turn to issues posed by their nominalism (i.e., everything is particular and is what it is in name only) for morals and humans.