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Making Sense of Morality: Wielenberg’s Naturalistic Ethics

Various ethics terms

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Introduction

There is one more naturalist’s ethical views to consider, and they are quite unique compared to others we have seen. Rather than deny the existence of objective, universal moral properties (i.e., types), Erik Wielenberg (b. 1972) affirms them. To him, they are Platonic kinds of entities, not being reducible to just physical things.

Wielenberg’s Ethics

For him, there are natural facts and moral facts. Particular moral instances (tokens) supervene upon particular physical facts. So, the particular moral properties instanced in a given act or person depend completely upon its non-moral properties.

 Why do moral properties supervene on non-moral ones? Wielenberg appeals to the “making” relation, which is a kind of causation. There is a natural fact of an act of deliberate cruelty that makes the act morally wrong (Wielenberg, 16). To him this making relation is a brute fact, one without further explanation.

Moreover, moral properties are epiphenomenal; they do not have any causal powers of their own to exert upon natural facts (Wielenberg, 13-14). He also allows the existence of the felt-qualities (i.e., qualia) of experiences, desires, etc. Beyond these concessions, humans basically are made of physical stuff.

Wielenberg also appeals to certain inalienable rights and obligations that humans have. These have arisen due to the cognitive capacities endowed upon us by evolution (Wielenberg, 56). These include, for instance, capacities to reason, set goals, suffer, and fall in love (51).

Assessment

Wielenberg seems to recognize that morals are not just descriptive things, which they would seem to be if naturalism is true. Instead, there is something irreducibly normative about them. Moreover, he steers clear of potential problems with morals if they are just particulars; after all, why should we all be just and loving, or not murder or rape, if those aren’t universals?

Nevertheless, there are a few problems with his view to highlight. First, in his example about the natural fact that an act is deliberately cruel, he seems to pack a normative, moral notion, cruelty, into his description of the natural, non-moral properties. Thus, it seems he presupposes that the natural is intrinsically moral. Yet, this move is at odds with naturalism, for it would posit essences to natural things. As we have seen, too, naturalists deny that there are intrinsically moral qualities that are part of nature.

Moreover, since moral properties are epiphenomenal, it is hard to see how we could know them. Since humans basically are physical, it seems we would come to know something by that thing causing a physical state in us. But since moral properties instanced in us cannot cause anything, they cannot cause such physical states. Thus it seems we could not begin to know them.

Consider also his claim of inalienable moral rights. On his view, the moral equality all humans would have depends upon their natural properties. Yet, we differ in terms of these natural properties. Not all humans have these cognitive abilities, and they differ in degree. If so, why should someone who lacks in these natural abilities be treated as equal with another who possesses them to greater degrees?

Nor would moral properties have anything to do with the moral judgments we make. Our cognitive capacities are the results of evolutionary adaptations, and while Wielenberg seems to think that evolution could give rise to capacities to know truth, it is far more likely that particular adaptations will not give us knowledge of the truth. After all, what counts in evolution is not truth, but survival and the passing on of one’s genes. Furthermore, if a murder is committed, then clearly it will shape our moral beliefs about that action (that it is wrong) and what should be done about it (e.g., a person should be convicted).

Moreover, there will be evolutionary variations in adaptations amongst all humans. If this is so, then, as Angus Menuge observes, it seems people across the globe could have varieties of moral beliefs, including ones that do not uphold Wielenberg’s inalienable rights of other humans, or our core morals.

For Further Reading

Angus Menuge, Review of Robust Ethics, in Faith and Philosophy 33:2 (2016).

Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.

Making Sense of Morality: John Rawls’s Ethics

Various ethics terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Another more naturalistic form of ethics comes from John Rawls (d. 2002), which might be better described as secular. Rawls’s works have had enormous influence, especially in his conception of justice as fairness.

Overview of Rawls’s Political Liberalism

Taking democracy as his starting point, Rawls spells out the basis for how today we can come together and form the basis for such a society. Yet, this faces the challenge of a plurality of reasonable, competing “doctrines” (conceptual frameworks, or paradigms) that address substantive notions of the nature of the good, the meaning of life, and more. These doctrines appeal to metaphysical, moral, and/or religious views, including substantive understandings of justice. Examples could be religious groups and adherents of different philosophies and worldviews.

Each “doctrine,” he thinks, has its own internal rationale for its beliefs. What justifies them is not that they correspond with reality, for, similar to Kant, we cannot know that directly. Instead, they should be internally coherent. Yet, this means each doctrine will have its own criteria for the substantive questions of life, making them largely incommensurable. If so, it seems we cannot form a democratic society on the basis of these private, substantive kinds of reasoning.

How then can we form a society on the basis of apparently neutral, public reasons? Rawls uses a thought experiment in which representatives of different groups are in an original position, behind a veil of ignorance. They are to reason as though they are abstracted from their lives’ situations and conditions, and they are to choose principles of public, procedural justice as the basis of a society. He claims they would adopt two principles: 1) the equality principle: there is an equal claim for all citizens to basic rights and liberties; and 2) the difference principle: there is equality of opportunity, and the greatest benefit should go to the least advantaged socially and/or economically. He thinks the members of these different “doctrines” can find an overlapping consensus and form a social contract based on these two principles of procedural justice.

Assessment

Rawls tries to take seriously the fact of diversity and how we can come together as a unified society. He also realizes that while doctrinal views may differ greatly, nonetheless we can dialogue and find commonalities.

Yet, there are several problems with his views. Rawls thinks a secular, procedural basis for justice enables him to remain neutral in regards to the various doctrines. He too would need to be philosophically neutral, for such views belong to the doctrines, he claims. But, Rawls’s own views are not philosophically neutral. He has bracketed out any metaphysical notions of justice and other morals. He also has privileged his epistemology, that we cannot know such morals as they are in reality. Thus, we should embrace epistemic coherentism (a belief is justified not by its correspondence with reality, but by its internal coherence within a given web of beliefs).

Put differently, Rawls seems to think he can set aside his own standpoint and gain a neutral vantage point, to claim no one doctrine’s philosophical views can be a suitable basis for a democracy today. Yet, he seems to be privileging his own doctrinal stance, that secular thought is what is needed.

Therefore, Rawls’s reasoning invites the question: why shouldn’t the competing doctrines argue publicly, to see if they can offer compelling reasons for their views of the nature of justice, the good life, etc.? Just because we have a plurality of moral viewpoints, it does not follow that none is more rationally defensible than another. The mere fact of diversity does not necessitate a procedural basis for justice.

Another concern is his concept of a person as one “who can take part in, or who can play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties. Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life” (Rawls, 18). Yet, this understanding could exclude many people, including those with permanent disabilities, from protection as citizens.

For Further Reading

John Rawls, Political Liberalism

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 7

Making Sense of Morality: Christine Korsgaard’s Naturalistic Ethics

Various ethics terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction

Now I will turn away from analyzing naturalistic, ethical options in terms of noncognitivism and cognitivism. Here, I will explore the views of a few individuals, starting with Christine Korsgaard (b. 1952).

Korsgaard’s Kantian Ethics

Like Mackie, Korsgaard rejects objectively real, intrinsically moral properties as very “queer.” Instead, the world is made of matter. How then does she derive ethical prescriptions?

She thinks that apart from our valuing something or some action, there is no value in the world. We do this by imposing our reason onto the material world. For her, this is like what Kant taught us, that we are to will what should be universally the case (i.e., by acting autonomously). This is an exercise of our practical reason.

One basis for her move is she thinks that if, like Plato thought, objectively real, intrinsically moral properties exist, then it is hard to see why they should have anything to do with us, since we are material. In that case, why should a person be moral? I think this is a good concern with Plato’s own views, to which I will return much later.

Instead, she thinks the only way we can secure our obligation to be moral in light of naturalism is by imposing reason onto reality (i.e., matter). By using practical reason, we self-legislate and construct our moral norms. These practical reasons exist and are prescriptive. We construct them by reason and universalize them by following Kant’s categorical imperative.

How do we go about forming these reasons? Korsgaard thinks it occurs as we are guided by our various practical identities. Such identities are descriptions according to which people find their lives to be worth living, and their actions worthwhile. By treating our human identity as normative, we regard it as a source of reasons and obligations, which she labels a moral identity. Then, ourmoral identity yields universal obligations, and that makes us, like Kant thought, members of the kingdom of ends. That is, we should always should be treated as valuable in ourselves, and not merely as a means to some end.

Assessment

If naturalism is true, then Korsgaard’s ethics makes much sense. There are no intrinsic morals in a naturalistic world. Yet, we do experience the importance of morality, and it seems that morality would have to be a construct of some sort. She clearly recognizes this, and her appeal to Kant fits well with her project. Moreover, she is right that our practical reasons exist and are normative. They are real, even though they do not exist independently of us.

Now, moral normativity depends upon us and our being able to use practical reason. Three issues arise here. First, what if some humans are unable to use their reason adequately, or at all? Would they thereby become disqualified from being valued in themselves? Also, who decides if they can reason “adequately”? Second, what if some do not see their lives as worth living? Does that also disqualify them from being valued in themselves? If so, may they be discarded or actively euthanized? Third, Korsgaard assumes we can reason on naturalism. Yet, later, I will examine to see if that is so.

Korsgaard could reply that there is a safeguard based upon the universalizability principle. We should will what we want to be normative and universal for all. But, this could be misused, it seems. For example, all persons should be treated with dignity seems very universalizable. Yet, then a separate, descriptive matter arises, to which all may not universally agree: are all humans persons? If not, some humans could be treated as means to an end due to a nonmoral decision. That is, her criterion of universalizability may not be sufficient to prevent abuses.

Further, Korsgaard’s proposal depends upon our treating ourselves as valuable. But, why should we, if we know naturalism is true? We can play that “game,” and if we live in affluent conditions, that might seem satisfactory. But, for those in oppressive conditions, that “game” could become unbearable.

For Further Reading

Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 7

Making Sense of Morality: Naturalism and Objectivist Ethics

Various ethical terms

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Introduction

Now let’s shift to explore objectivist options for naturalism (i.e., ethical naturalism) within moral cognitivism. These views reduce morals to natural facts, so that scientists can measure them empirically, whether that be physiologically, biologically, chemically, or otherwise. There are no intrinsically moral properties. Furthermore, moral statements are about facts concerning (1) objects thought to have moral value, or (2) moral actions.

Options for Ethical Naturalism

Here are some strategies for reducing morals to natural facts. Morals are:

  1. What most people desire or approve;
  2. What an impartial observer approves;
  3. What maximizes desire or interest; or
  4. What furthers survival.

First, all these kinds of things are descriptive in nature. But, that seems to lose the normativity of moral principles and virtues. How then do we get the moral ought from what simply is the case descriptively?

Morals need to be identical to natural facts. Yet, these strategies face problems. Consider (1): While what most people desire could be good (such as being loved), it also could be something clearly immoral. In the early 1800s, most people in the Deep South in the U. S. desired to keep slavery as an institution. Similarly, in the 1960s, what most white people wanted in that area was segregation from African-Americans. Yet both policies were clearly wrong.

Alternatively, while most people there did not desire to end racial discrimination against African-Americans, nonetheless Martin Luther King, Jr.’s efforts were right to try to do so. We also could look at others examples where what most people desired, or approved, was wrong, such as anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, or apartheid in South Africa.

How about (2)?  Besides the problem of how to get the normative moral property from what is descriptive, (2) raises the prospects of just how impartial anyone could be. All of us are shaped and influenced by a wide range of factors, including our worldviews. If someone is a naturalist (or a Buddhist or theist), would that person really be able to set aside all that conceptual framework to be impartial in the needed ways? Additionally, it is possible that what an impartial observer approves of still could be immoral.

Regarding (3), the same issues explored above with the southern U. S. could repeat here. And with (4), what furthers survival could be immoral. Arguably, the Nazis aimed to preserve the purity (and thus survival) of the Aryan race, but in so doing they would kill off those they deemed to be “defective.” Also, on the basis of (4), some acts of genocide could be justified. After all, if morality is what furthers survival, why should the weak survive? Yet, justice often requires defending the defenseless against those who are oppressing them.

Cornell Realism

All these ethical naturalist options are realist; they affirm that morals are real, yet they are nothing but natural kinds of things. There is another ethical naturalist option, called “Cornell Realism,” and developed by Richard Boyd (b. 1942), Nicholas Sturgeon (b. 1942), and David Brink (b. 1958). Like other naturalists, there are no intrinsically moral facts. Still, our ethical beliefs (such as Hitler was morally depraved) are justified in light of their coherence with our whole body of beliefs, which is shaped by naturalism. For them, we do not have direct access to moral or other kinds of facts; we always access them through our “conceptual grid,” or interpretive framework. Our moral beliefs and theories give us approximations to the truth.

Later, I will address this coherentist idea more. Still, we already have seen some commonalities with Kant’s views. The question will be if we can access reality at all on such a view. For now, notice that for them, moral facts still are natural facts, and though we conceive of them as moral ones, what is moral is just a matter of our interpretation. If so, a people could conceive of murder or rape as right. But, we clearly know such interpretations would be wrong.

For Further Reading

Richard Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 5

Making Sense of Morality: Error Theory

Various ethical terms

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Naturalism and Error Theory

Still another kind of naturalistic moral cognitivism is error theory, which has been defended by J. L. Mackie (d. 1981) and Richard Joyce (b. 1966). Mackie used two arguments for his view. First, the argument from relativity maintains that empirically, there are many moral differences amongst people. For him, the best explanation is that moral judgments are tied to different forms (or ways) of life, each of which has its way of interpreting reality. Second, the argument from queerness says that, if objectively real, moral qualities would be very bizarre things in an otherwise naturalistic world. Since we know natural kinds of things empirically, to know objectively real, intrinsically moral properties would require some extraordinary faculty.

Moreover, moral discourse is dependent upon institutional facts. Unlike brute facts about the world itself, which are natural, institutional facts are social constructs, due to how people in various societies (or forms of life) have constructed their institutions and their rules that guide peoples’ actions, including moral discourse. When people speak as though morals are objectively real and not dependent on their social, institutional settings, they show that moral discourse really is filled with error.

Joyce follows Mackie in that there are no independently real moral facts. Still, as a kind of moral cognitivism, error theorists do maintain that we do make moral judgments. However, since there are no real moral qualities, these claims are systematically false and thus filled with error.

Still, Joyce thinks that error theory does not demand that people give up engaging in moral speech. It is just that, to be consistent, their speech act is only making an assertion. They are not believing these moral claims to be true. Additionally, since error theorists reject the existence of any real moral properties, they deny that any action is moral or immoral. Nevertheless, they still can oppose others’ actions, for that need not require that they believe objective moral properties exist.

Assessment

Error theorists consistently hold that on naturalism, there are no intrinsically moral properties. This naturalistic view of what morals are trades upon language use. They are just ways of speaking according to the “grammar” (or, rules) of a given people that allows them to use moral discourse, yet while (apparently) avoiding the reality of morals.

Now, we will see when we explore ethical relativism that while there is a fact of moral diversity amongst people and cultures, nonetheless those differences may not be as wide or deep as we have been taught. Instead, we can identify common morals that may be applied differently (e.g., how people in one culture show respect for their elders, versus how people in another culture do so). Further, just because there is a descriptive fact of diversity, that alone does not give us ethical relativism, which is a normative thesis.

Granted, too, irreducibly moral properties would be rather “queer” given naturalism. But, perhaps there are independent reasons why we should question that assumption. In later essays, I will suggest a few such reasons.

Moreover, it is true that we may speak in ways that do not necessarily commit us to the reality of things we are talking about. Generally, mere word uses do not have power to cause things to come into existence (except, for instance, stories). A scientific example was talk of phlogiston to explain combustion. Later, however, scientists discovered it was not real; instead, oxygen was what was involved.

 Further, error theory does not explain why we find morality to be such a ubiquitous aspect of life. After all, why talk morally if there are no morals? While error theory explains why we can talk morally, given naturalism, it still does not give us an adequate explanation of what morals are. If they are just the way we use words, then we can change morals by changing how we talk. In that case, murder could become right, and justice could become bad. But surely that is false.

For Further Reading

Richard Joyce, “Mackie’s arguments for the moral error theory,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 5

Making Sense of Morality: Sociobiology

Various ethical terms
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Ruse and Evolutionary Ethics

Michael Ruse (b. 1940) is another cognitivist in that moral sentences can be true or false. Yet, he is not an objectivist. If he were, then moral statements would be about facts concerning moral acts or objects thought to have moral value. Yet, there are no intrinsically moral properties, or any that transcend our biology. Instead, he too is a subjectivist. Moral discourse ends up being a way of describing the biological. Ruse also grounds ethics in naturalistic evolution and science.

Ruse’s Sociobiology

Ruse rejects as a myth the older paradigm that evolution is essentially progressive and that it generates value, for humans are its successful endpoint. Instead, he embraces sociobiology, in which morality is part of biology. Social norms develop by their evolutionary emergence.

On this view, moral behavior simply is a biological adaptation. Cooperation with others is a good survival strategy, which he claims is virtually the norm in the animal kingdom. Since we cooperate, we are successful in surviving and reproducing. Moreover, “social success” leads to the evolution of more efficient means of cooperation.

Following Richard Dawkins’s idea of the “selfish” gene, Ruse believes that what appear to be “altruistic” acts relate back to an individual’s self-interest. That is, such acts occur because ultimately they benefit the performer’s biological ends. But, since we have a self-centered nature, and we have adapted via sociality, we need a mechanism to break through that self-centeredness. Morality is that mechanism, which has been selected for cooperative behavior.

So, Ruse thinks he can derive the moral ought from what biologically is the case and thereby avoid the issue posed by the “naturalistic fallacy”: i.e., how do we get what is morally normative from what is biologically descriptive? Moreover, he is consistent as a naturalist, denying that there are any intrinsic morals. While morality seems objective to us, it does not exist objectively (i.e., independently of us), for it is an illusion of our genes.

While this position might make Ruse’s ethics seem vulnerable to charges of relativism, he flatly rejects that charge. Instead, he strongly rejects as immoral many clear cases of wrongdoing, such as rape, Hitler’s savagery, female circumcision, and more. 

Assessment

Clearly, Ruse’s ethics is an important attempt to account for ethics in a naturalistic, evolutionary framework. Surely he is right that cooperation is a good strategy for survival, and that humans seem to have a self-centered nature. He also rightly addresses the need to preserve the oughtness of morality, that it not be reduced merely to what is the case.

Now, Ruse admits that “altruistic” and “selfish” are metaphorical ways of describing behaviors. They are not the case in reality, for morality simply is an illusion. Indeed, all moral discourse would seem to be a metaphorical way of talking about biological behavior.

In that case, Ruse’s claim that his view can preserve the normativity of morality (especially of core morals like murder and rape are wrong) seems to do nothing of the sort. As he has admitted, there are no intrinsic moral properties, even to biology. But, generally, how we talk about something does not confer new properties upon it. Clearly, Ruse is not suggesting that our moral speech adds moral properties to biology. In that case, we can talk in whatever ways we want about morality, even that murder is right, but it will do nothing to change the biological facts of the matter, that there are no moral properties in our biology.

Furthermore, due to how natural selection happened to work, it is conceivable that we could have evolved differently, such that murder or rape would not be wrong, but perhaps even right and obligatory. After all, since morality’s “objectivity” is just an illusion of our genes, then murder’s or rape’s being wrong, or justice’s and love’s being good, could have turned out otherwise, or not ever have evolved. But that seems deeply mistaken.

For Further Reading

Michael Ruse, “Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach,” in Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Louis Pojman, 4th ed.

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 5

Making Sense of Morality: Naturalism and Subjectivist Ethics

Various ethical terms

Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Naturalism and Moral Cognitivist Options: Subjectivism

In terms of the meaning of moral sentences, naturalists also could be cognitivists. They maintain moral claims are truth apt, yet they still deny there are any intrinsically moral properties. There are three main branches of moral cognitivism: subjectivism, error theory, and objectivism. Subjectivists generally reduce morals to what a speaker likes or dislikes (private subjectivism), or what a culture likes or dislikes (cultural relativism). This essay will look at subjectivism in general, and then in particular at that of Gilbert Harman.

In general, while subjectivist theories about the meaning of moral statements are compatible with naturalism, there is an obvious problem with them – they reduce moral claims, which are normative, into merely descriptive ones. But that does not seem to do justice when we claim (for example) that murder is wrong. We do not mean that we simply dislike murder; rather, we mean it is wrong. For example, when we see people cry out for justice when a murder has been committed, it is not because they merely dislike murder. Instead, they know something morally wrong has been committed, and justice should be done.

Harman’s Subjectivism

Now, for Harman (b. 1938), there is another sense of subjectivism. According to him, moral facts are natural facts. Consistent with naturalism, there are no intrinsically moral facts. Moral facts should be understood as being relational facts, which are about reasons that are grounded in a given subject’s goals. Moreover, our moral beliefs arise from our interaction with natural facts. But that interaction always is conditioned by our upbringing and psychology, so all moral beliefs are our constructs. Morals are dependent upon us, so they are subjective in that sense.

In terms of moral reasons, Harman thinks people likely have them only if they have implicitly entered into an agreement with others about what to do. Nevertheless, these motivating reasons will not be the same for all, and he thinks it is likely only some people have made those agreements. So, Harman’s ethics is relativistic.

Discussion

For now, let me make some observations about Harman’s ethics. For one, we can see a consistent naturalistic position at work, that there are no intrinsically moral properties or facts. If everything is natural, and the world has been “disenchanted” of things like essential natures, then surely morals would not have essences either.

Also consistent with naturalism is his relativism, even though many naturalists have not embraced ethical relativism as a system. Still, it is consistent because naturalists usually are nominalists, and on that view, everything is particular. On ethical relativism, there are no universal morals, which fits very much with nominalism.

Notice too that he admits morals are our constructs. This will be true of ethical relativism in general, which we will discuss later. But, later I also will address an issue that I think will show that on naturalism all knowledge, even of morals, must be, at best, just our constructs. This will stand in contrast to what naturalists who are objectivists believe.

For Further Reading

Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, and Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 5

Making Sense of Morality: An Introduction to Naturalism

Various ethical terms
Image by Mary Pahlke from Pixabay

Introduction to Naturalism

The next major move in ethics has been based on naturalism, which roughly is the view that there is only the natural; there is nothing supernatural. Usually this means all that exists is physical or dependent upon the physical. There are no essential natures or universal properties, like Plato thought. Already, we have seen many shifts in this direction, with materialist, nominalist, and empiricist moves. Plus, the Scientific Revolution gave rise to the view that the universe is a causally closed machine. When Darwin’s Origin was published, there was no longer a need to appeal to God as Creator. Naturalism became the dominant worldview in the west.

Naturalistic Ethics

To be consistent, ethics needed to be adapted to a naturalistic framework. Historically, this has taken many forms. In this and the following essays on naturalistic ethics, I will focus on one or more such proposals. In this essay, I will look at naturalistic moral views that are noncognitivist. This will include A. J. Ayer’s emotivism and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism.

Noncognitivism

Moral noncognitivism includes the views that 1) intrinsically moral properties don’t exist, and 2) moral judgments are neither true nor false. While there is some debate about what moral judgments are, noncognitivism denies a place for beliefs. Since knowledge involves justified true beliefs, there is no moral knowledge on this view.

Ayer (d. 1989) was one of the logical positivists. Fitting with naturalism, meanings had to be something physical and empirically knowable. For them, a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verifiable. Ayer denied that moral sentences are meaningful; they do not have cognitive content and cannot be true or false. Sentences like “murder is wrong” is code language that just expresses emotions; e.g., “ugh, murder!” Similarly, “justice is good” translates to “hooray, justice!” His is a kind of emotivism. (Similarly, another noncognitivist option is prescriptivism: moral sentences just express commands; e.g., “don’t murder!” They too are not true or false.)

Simon Blackburn (b. 1944) is a noncognitivist who endorses quasi-realism. He too denies the reality of intrinsically moral properties since we live in a naturalistic, “disenchanted” world. He focuses on our ways of talking morally. His project attempts to give moral discourse the right to engage in talk as though morals exist (realism), and moral claims are true or false. Based on the surface grammar of a moral sentence, we can treat them as such. But, like Ayer, there really are no morals, and moral claims are not true or false. In both Ayer’s and Blackburn’s cases, the focus is on the way we talk morally and the denial of intrinsically moral properties.  

Assessment

What should we make of these noncognitivist views? First, by reducing away any cognitive content from moral sentences, they end up being merely descriptive. But, morality deeply seems to be about what is normative, or prescriptive. If people protest against a miscarriage of justice (e.g., an unarmed African-American man who was walking down a street, but was murdered by white men), they are not merely emoting. Instead, they deeply believe there was an injustice done, which is why they are upset.

Second, moral judgments are not identical with feelings or commands, for the former can occur without the latter. We do not need to have any feelings when we state, “Murder is wrong.” And, we can have feelings without moral judgments.

Third, there is no room for any moral education or training on these views, since there is no cognitive content to learn and therefore no real moral disagreement. But, this result undermines any training in moral virtue, such as in why we should address examples of injustices in society. It also does not do justice to the fact that many of us do disagree morally. This is plain to see when we look at the many social and moral issues we deliberate and debate.

These noncognitivist views undermine our four core morals, but there are more naturalistic options yet to be considered.

For Further Reading

A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic

Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 5

Two Idols of U.S. Evangelicals Today? Science and Politics

Virus Image by Arek Socha from Pixabay; Political Image by chayka1270 from Pixabay

I am afraid that today, many evangelicals in the U.S. subtly have given room to two idols, and that cannot please God. I think that can happen by ultimately placing their trust in two things. If so, how could that happen?  

How? Christians Have Been Shaped by Naturalism

In a series of blogs under the category of the “normal Christian life,” I argued that Christians in the west, and especially in the United States, have been deeply shaped by naturalism. I also wrote about this in ch. 2 of my Authentically Emergent. Now, I don’t mean that they have denied God’s existence. That would be the case on philosophical naturalism. Roughly, that’s the view that there’s only the natural; there is no supernatural – and the natural usually is defined as being physical.

Instead, there’s another version that can, and does, affect Christians – preternaturalism. On it, Christians could officially hold to orthodox doctrine and God’s existence, yet (perhaps subtly) not really tend to seek Him for His power in daily life. To the extent God is thought to be “irrelevant,” Christians practically would tend to be living in their own strength, wisdom, and power. That kind of view lends itself to a functional deism – that, in practice, we regard God as being somewhat distant, leading us (again, to various extents) to rely on ourselves.

Two Idols

Two ways I think evangelicals, at least in the states, can rely on themselves and other things are in science and politics. How so? First, consider many evangelicals’ (and others’) responses to COVID-19. It seems our great hope is in scientists developing a vaccine, all the while we try to flatten the number of cases by practicing good hygiene, including masks and handwashing, and social distancing.

Now, there is nothing wrong with implementing and following such measures; after all, God gave us medicine and reason so we could help combat the effects of the fall through illnesses. Yet, what I seldom read or hear about is Christians’ turning to God in deep dependence, repenting of any known sins, and trusting Him to stop this virus. And, surely God can use scientists to do that – so, I am in favor of science and the pursuit of a vaccine.

But, the question is: ultimately, where is our trust as Christians? Is it ultimately in scientists and what they can develop, or is it in the living God, who is almighty and our healer? If it is the former, then they have become an idol. From what I have heard (and I could be missing some things), there is a relative lack of deep dependence on God Himself to deliver us from COVID-19.

Second, consider American evangelicals and politics today. While there is not a uniformity amongst evangelicals in favor of Donald Trump and his actions, nonetheless, amongst many vocal ones, there still seems to be a general mindset that if you are not for Trump, you are not a good Christian.

Surely he is a flawed person – and we all are. Personally, I think he has taken some good stands on some matters, but not all. But, whether we agree on that or not is not the point. My concern is that there is a tendency for evangelicals to make him an idol, as though he is the savior of America and the world.

This feels like a replay of the 80s and the ways in which evangelicals put their trust to too great a degree in political power in order to try to secure policies in line with God’s will. Now, I am not saying that Christians and politics should have nothing to do with each other. If we don’t influence political leaders, they will be left to do what is right in their own eyes, and these days, that likely will not be from a biblically informed worldview. Jesus is to be Lord of all, and so He has things to say to politics and power! But, again, the issue is where our trust really lies. If we place it in a human being, we are in effect making that person into an idol, and that cannot please God.

Conclusion

It doesn’t take much to see that we are living in very serious times, and we deeply need the Lord in all His fullness of Spirit and truth. But that means there is no room for idolatry, especially amongst Christians.

Making Sense of Morality: Bentham, Mill, and Utilitarianism

Bentham, Mill, & utilitarian terms
Image by rdaconnect from Pixabay

Introduction

After Kant, the next major thinkers in the Enlightenment were the utilitarians. Two exemplars were Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832) and John Stuart Mill (d. 1873). On utilitarianism, no morals are intrinsically right or wrong, or good or bad. Following the trend we’ve seen, they thought pleasures and pains, and benefits and harms, could be measured empirically. Utilitarianism uses means-to-end reasoning to determine what is moral, based on the sum of an action’s consequences.  

Bentham, Mill, and More

Bentham was a hedonistic utilitarian: what action maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain is right. He treated all pleasures and pains alike, focusing on the net quantity of pleasure. But Mill realized some pleasures (e.g., intellectual ones) are better than others (e.g., sensual ones). Thus he focused on their quality. For him, we should act to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number.

There also is act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. The former focuses on individual acts; the one that maximizes utility should be performed. The latter looks at kinds of acts that, from experience, we know tend to maximize utility. This is helpful, e.g., in taxation policies, so that we don’t have to re-run the calculus each time we consider a proposal.  

Assessment

There definitely is a place for appeals to utility in moral reasoning. E.g., when crafting public policy, we should consider the likely consequences of a proposed action, even when a deontological principle clearly applies. After all, people have to live with such decisions. Moreover, utilitarianism appeals to people, especially in secular societies, as apparently being morally neutral. There is no appeal to God or some other set of values to determine what is moral.

However, what gets to count as a “good” or “bad” consequence in the first place? Who gets to decide that? According to whom is something (or someone) more valuable than another? Biases easily could enter the calculation here. To make such judgments seems to presuppose some outside standard, beyond utility.

Another issue is that utilitarianism seems inadequate in terms of how it treats motives. Yet, surely they are morally important. If someone kills another, it makes a major difference if it was done intentionally or accidentally. We rightly recognize that difference in the law.

Relatedly, utilitarianism undermines acts of moral supererogation, ones that are heroic and praiseworthy, yet not required. Suppose someone is jogging but notices another person in danger of being attacked by a third person with a knife. While we should expect that jogger to at least call for help (call the police or cry out, to scare off the attacker), it would be above and beyond the call of duty for that jogger to fight off the attacker and save the would-be victim. Yet, on utilitarianism, that act would be obligatory if it would result overall in net good consequences.

Perhaps most significantly, utilitarianism makes net utility the basis for what is moral. Consider again our core morals: murder and rape are wrong, and justice and love are good. If the good consequences of a murder outweigh the bad, then that act would be justified and even obligatory. The same goes for rape, whether under act or rule utilitarianism. But these results clearly are deeply mistaken, to say the least. If this justification held, it could be moral to rape another person, or murder a racial minority person who is protesting peacefully for civil rights. But, we deeply know such acts are wrong; otherwise, why would there be such uproars against these acts?

Likewise, justice would be reduced to whatever is the result of the calculation. A rape or murder would be just in a society that is predominately one race if that act would maximize the overall benefits for the majority. Yet, if these acts can be just on this moral system, we have lost justice. Indeed, murder’s and rape’s wrongness, and justice’s and love’s goodness, seem to be intrinsically so.

So, it seems utilitarianism undermines our four core morals and is inadequate as the basis for ethics.

For Further Reading

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism

R. Scott Smith, In Search of Moral Knowledge, ch. 4